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Abstract
The United States Supreme Court has increasingly referred to specific foreign legal authorities 
and practices, as well as international conventions, in decisions involving purely domestic concerns.   
While the Court, to date, has only given such materials persuasive, and not binding, effect in such 
instances, a number of legislators and commentators in both the media and the legal academy have 
expressed concern over foreign and international law’s increasing role in constitutional jurisprudence.
This article critiques what it defines as the Court’s increasing internationalism – the use of 
foreign law and international conventions as persuasive authority in cases with little or no implications 
beyond U.S. borders.  It suggests that the Court should both refuse to expand and reconsider this approach 
to constitutional adjudication.  The article first examines the history of the Court’s use of foreign and 
international law in illustrating how this so-called “cosmopolitan approach” to decisionmaking constitutes 
a relatively recent phenomenon.  After exploring the current state of the debate over the degree to which 
the Court should incorporate non-U.S. legal perspectives into its interpretations of the Constitution, the 
article suggests some negative consequences that might result from the Court’s basing conclusions of law 
on anything but American authorities and practices when evaluating domestic constitutional issues. 
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2INTRODUCTION
To what extent are foreign laws, court decisions, international conventions, and 
even social and cultural traditions or practices relevant to determining the protections and 
guarantees of the United States Constitution?  Over the past three years, the United States 
Supreme Court has invoked such resources as persuasive authority in a number of highly 
publicized cases that involve purely domestic concerns.  The Court has taken what this 
article will call a more internationalist approach to constitutional interpretation in the 
cases of Atkins v. Virginia, which declared unconstitutional the imposition of the death 
penalty on the mentally retarded,1 and Grutter v. Bollinger, which upheld the use of race-
based affirmative action measures in university admissions.2  More prominently, the 
Court invalidated all laws criminalizing sexual relationships between individuals of the 
same gender in Lawrence v. Texas.3  Finally, in this term’s Roper v. Simmons, the Court 
referred to foreign authorities as “instructive” in striking down all U.S. death penalty law 
provisions allowing the execution of juveniles.4
Consequently, in view of their votes on these decisions or remarks to various 
organizations, Justices John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, 
David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer have explicitly expressed an 
interest in further utilizing foreign legal sources and international conventions in future 
cases.5  In contrast, Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas have generally decried 
1
 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2
 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
3
 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
4
 Roper v. Simmons, No. 03-633, 2005 U.S.LEXIS 2200 at *44 (Mar. 1, 2005)(print citation currently 
unavailable).
5 See, e.g., Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address Before the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the 
American Society of International Law (March 16, 2002), in 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 348 (2002); 
Hope Yen, O’Connor Extols Role of International Law in Post-Sept. 11 World, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 
3this practice as inappropriate under most circumstances.6  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
overall record in terms of votes and speeches also demonstrates skepticism about this 
trend, though perhaps not to the same degree.7  Yet perhaps because these judicial 
decisions and statements by justices signal what international law professors Lori 
Damrosch and Bernard Oxman have called “a long-term trend toward a more 
cosmopolitan jurisprudence,”8 some Supreme Court litigants have begun to adamantly 
advocate a greater role for foreign legal perspectives in regard to their own disputes.9
27, 2004, at Washington Dateline; Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An 
International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253 (1999) (arguing the relevance of 
international law to constitutional interpretation concerning affirmative action); Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Remarks for the American Constitution Society (August 2, 2003)(available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/inthecourts/Ginsburg_transcript_080203.pdf); Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2003); Stephen Breyer, The Supreme Court and the New International 
Law, Remarks Before The Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law
97th Annual Meeting, Apr. 4, 2003, in 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265 (2003); Stephen Breyer, Remarks 
to the Paris Bar Association (November 11, 2004)(video available at http://www.c-
span.org/videoarchives.asp?CatCodePairs=Series,AC&ArchiveDays=100); Stephen Breyer, Constitutional 
Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions, Transcript of Discussion Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices 
Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer – American University Washington College of Law (Jan. 13, 
2005)(available at  http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/ 
1D265343BDC2189785256B810071F238/1F2F7DC4757FD01E85256F890068E6E0?OpenDocument.
6 See Ann Gearan, Foreign Rulings Not Relevant To High Court, Scalia, Says, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 3, 
2004, at A07; Antonin Scalia, Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions, Transcript of 
Discussion Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer – American 
University Washington College of Law (Jan. 13, 2005)(available at  
http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/ 1D265343BDC2189785256B810071F238/
1F2F7DC4757FD01E85256F890068E6E0?OpenDocument; Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990
(2002)(Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)(“This Court…should not impose foreign moods, fads, 
or fashions on Americans”).
7
 For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented in Atkins, Grutter, Lawrence, and Roper.  But in writing 
for the majority in Washington v. Glucksberg, which upheld Washington state’s ban on assisted suicide, he 
noted that the Supreme Court of Canada had reached a similar decision and that Australia, Britain, and New 
Zealand outlawed the practice.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 718 (1997).  Similarly, Rehnquist 
once called for the greater use of foreign legal sources for reference purposes in a 1989 speech.  William H. 
Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts – Comparative Remarks (1989), reprinted in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC 
LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE – A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411, 412 (Paul Kirchof & Donald 
P. Kommers eds. 1993).
8
 Lori Damrosch & Bernard Oxman, Agora: The United States Constitution And International Law –
Editor’s Introduction, 98 AM. J. INT’L. LAW 42 (2004).   
9
 For example, the cases of “enemy combatants” detained at the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, 
witnessed numerous amicus briefs, some on behalf of foreign government officials, urging the Court to 
consider the detentions’ international law implications.  See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae 175 Members of 
Both Houses of the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Rasul v. 
Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004)(No. 03-334, 03-343), available at
4In some instances, the Court has apparently paid attention.  In Roper, the Court 
acknowledged other countries and international conventions that had banned the 
execution of juvenile murderers after having received a significant number of amicus
briefs from foreign legal and human rights organizations, past Nobel Peace Prize 
recipients, and former U.S. diplomats centering on one general theme – that executing 
such persons violated the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by contradicting 
prevailing norms of international law, as most countries’ abolition of the practice 
evidenced.10    Less notably, in an action last term concerning whether a federal district 
court compel the release of evidentiary materials for use in hearings before the European 
Commission, the Court allowed the Commission’s attorneys to participate in oral 
arguments in the amicus capacity in which they had filed briefs.11  This development 
constituted the first time the Court had ever allowed a foreign government to avail itself 
of this already rare privilege.
While legal scholars have both praised and criticized this direction the Court has 
taken,12 in addition to vehement criticisms of the Court in both print and electronic 
media,13 perhaps a recent action by the Bush Administration best indicates that the 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/inthecourts/gitmo_briefs/Parliament_United_Kingdom_Northern_
Ireland.pdf.
10 See Brief of Amici Curiae The Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales et al., Roper 
v. Simmons, No. 03-633 (U.S. Supreme Court argued Oct. 13, 2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/
crimjust/juvjus/simmons/engwales.pdf; Brief of Amici Curiae President James Earl Carter, Jr., Roper, 
available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/ juvjus/simmons/nobel.pdf; Brief of Amici Curiae Former U.S. 
Diplomats, Roper, available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/simmons/diplomats.pdf.
11
 Oral Argument Transcript at 16-25, Intel Corp. V. Adv. Micro Devices, Inc., 124 S. Ct. 2466 (2004)(No. 
02-572).   Citation according to the United States Reports for 2004 is not available yet.
12 See, e.g., Lori Damrosch et al., Agora:The United States Constitution And International Law, 98 AM. J. 
INT’L. LAW 42 (2004).
13
 In fact, much of these criticisms have taken very aggressive or sarcastic tones.  See, e.g., MARK R. 
LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: HOW THE SUPREME COURT IS DESTROYING AMERICA 18-22 (Regnery Publishing, 
Inc. 2005)(criticizes the views of Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg on utilizing non-U.S. 
legal sources as expressed in prior opinions and speeches).  See also Townhall.com Editors, U.S. 
Constitution: Made In Jamaica? (Mar. 18, 2005), available at http://www.townhall.com/columnists/Guest
5Court’s use of foreign law or international conventions in decisionmaking merits 
attention beyond the legal academy and specialized areas of the press.  At the end of this 
term, in Medellin v. Dretke, the Court will rule on the enforceability of a United Nations 
International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) order that the U.S. review the death sentences of 51 
Mexican nationals convicted of murder.  The I.C.J. found that the U.S. had denied these 
individuals the right to seek aid from their country’s diplomatic representatives as 
guaranteed by the Optional Protocol of the 1969 Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, which the U.S. had ratified.  The Protocol requires signatories to let the I.C.J. 
make the final decision as to when one country illegally denies a foreign national the 
right to seek consulate assistance when taken into custody.  And on March 10, 2005, the 
State Department announced that the U.S. had withdrawn from the Protocol, apparently 
reflecting a concern among White House policymakers that international law was 
beginning to exert an unwelcome level of influence over domestic affairs.14
Given all this issue’s heightened prominence, the judiciary as a whole may well 
benefit from a definition by the Supreme Court of when and when not to refer to non-
U.S. law and international conventions in the processes of constitutional interpretation 
and decisionmaking.  This article suggests just such a framework.
Foreign materials, which this article defines as a country’s specific laws or court 
decisions, as well as international conventions and treaties, can indeed assist judges in 
interpreting the Constitution as it applies to matters involving such conventions, 
international law, or some sort of foreign interest.  But the decisions that have generated 
Columns/printEditors20050318.shtml; Edwin Fuelner, Courting Trouble (Mar. 9, 2005), available at http://
www.townhall.com/columnists/edwinfuelner/printef20050309.shtml.
14
 Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn From World Judicial Body, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at 
A16.  This decision is also significant because the U.S. itself invoked the Protocol on such occasions as a 
1979 action against Iran in the I.C.J. for the seizure of 52 American hostages.
6most of the debate concerning the proper role of foreign and international law in 
American jurisprudence have primarily involved purely domestic matters that mandate no 
reference to anything other than American law.  These rulings have entailed using the 
existence or absence of laws concerning a specific issue in selected countries as 
secondary support for upholding or invalidating the same sort of law here in the U.S.  
And while none of these decisions has so far bound any segment of American case law to 
a non-American law, the shortcomings of utilizing foreign authority in this manner 
become more palpable if one hypothesizes that a specific guarantee or privilege should 
or should not exist in U.S. law specifically because the same guarantee or privilege does 
or does not exist in a foreign country.  This more aggressively internationalist approach is 
precisely what many of the amicus briefs in such cases as Roper advocated.
This article not only critiques this method of constitutional interpretation, but 
seeks to do so by transcending such traditional labels as left or right, Republican or 
Democrat, and originalist or pragmatic.  The Court’s references to foreign law in the past 
few terms’ decisions have indeed favored outcomes that are indeed “liberal” from a 
perspective of contemporary American social policy.15  Furthermore, in considering this 
issue within the context of legal theory, an adherent to the originalist school of thought 
would probably not approve of referring to foreign law in order to decide a domestic 
constitutional issue.16
15
 The contemporary use of the term “liberal” in the United States varies with the use of the term elsewhere 
in the world.  In Europe, for example, liberalism generally refers to a respect for individual liberties and a 
belief in a democratically accountable government, which should act to alleviate social ills without 
extensive intervention in society or the economy.  But in the United States, the definition of the term has 
evolved to include a belief in an active government role in combating actual or perceived social injustices.  
Views that typify such liberalism today, then, include support for abortion and homosexual rights and 
opposition to the death penalty.
16
 The leading academic theories of constitutional law include originalism and pragmatism.  Originalism 
basically holds that judges should construe the Constitution’s meaning on a given issue in a manner that is 
7Nevertheless, people who consider themselves politically liberal or who would 
rather judges not take on originalist approach to interpreting the Constitution should in 
fact be wary of courts’ use of non-U.S. legal principles or international agreements to 
decide purely domestic disputes, in contrast to any enthusiasm they might initially feel 
for any such developments.  Neither the Constitution, legislatures, or the Court have ever 
established a rule or framework governing the application of such authorities on a 
domestic basis in any circumstances other than those the Constitution already specifies.  
Even decisions that political conservatives or originalist legal theorists might criticize, 
such as the Warren Court’s rulings concerning criminal procedure and the right to 
privacy, still used the Constitution’s text as a fundamental basis for their analyses, even 
though their actual conclusions may have given the pertinent constitutional provisions a 
debatable meaning.
Foreign laws, however, do not stem from the same philosophical base, but from 
different circumstances, philosophies, traditions, and ideas.  A foreign law does not 
reflect an American constitutional principle or tradition, but merely represents the needs 
and characteristics of a different society and culture, even though some of these traits 
may outwardly resemble American ones.  In that way, foreign laws’ relevance to the 
circumstances surrounding an American legal issue with no external implications 
consistent with the original understanding of those who drafted and ratified the document.  Decisions, then, 
are made based on facts as they occurred when the document was enacted, and not according to 
adjustments for time or context. 
     In recent years, constitutional scholars have come up with a number of approaches that all reject the 
Constitution’s original meaning as a means of guiding judicial decisionmaking to some extent.  Perhaps the 
term “legal pragmatism” best encompasses this approach, which primarily concerns itself with a decision’s 
factual consequences.  Legal pragmatism consequently encourages the use of a more diverse set of data in 
interpreting the Constitution and views law as a guideline to be determined according to the specific 
context at hand.  For an extensive description and comparisionof originalism and pragmatism, with a focus 
on how each would apply to the use of foreign law in judicial decisionmaking, see Roger Alford, In Search 
Of A Thoery Of Constitutional Comparativism, 52 U.C.L.A. LAW REV. 1 (2005).
8whatsoever remains quite questionable.  And the range of these laws, and the social, 
cultural, and legal concepts they represent, is simply so vast and diverse, that a judge 
could probably find some foreign law supporting any outcome when considering a 
specific issue.  To date, Justice Breyer has offered what appears to be the most detailed 
framework for an internationalist approach to judicial decisionmaking – reference to 
“standards roughly comparable to our own constitutional standards in roughly 
comparable circumstances.”17  It is this absence of any more specific guideline for a 
judge determine how to apply non-American legal principles to purely domestic issues, 
given each national legal system’s own unique characteristics and idiosyncrasies, in a 
manner entirely consistent with the Constitution and the ideas it reflects, that remains 
problematic. 
 Part I of this article, then, explores how the U.S. Supreme Court has utilized 
foreign law and international conventions throughout its history.  The purpose of this 
overview is to show how the Court’s use of non-American legal authorities and 
international conventions not applying to the U.S. in purely domestic constitutional 
disputes primarily remains a phenomenon of roughly the past half-century.  And even in 
cases concerning agreements the U.S. has ratified, the Court has hesitated to give these 
sources binding effect.  Consequently, this part of the article seeks to rebut an argument  
that the internationalist approach’s proponents frequently offer – that the bulk of the 
Court’s case law sanctions this judicial decisionmaking method.
Part II explores the current state of the debate over foreign and international law’s 
role in American jurisprudence.  Specifically, this section identifies the concerns of many 
17 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999)(Breyer, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
9American policymakers in the wake of Lawrence and Roper and these decisions’ call for 
greater engagement of foreign legal authority in judicial decisionmaking.
Finally, part III presents a case against referring to non-American legal 
perspectives, whether they consist of actual laws, court decisions, provisions of 
international treaties the U.S. has not ratified, or even cultural practices or mores, as 
either advisory or binding authority in cases with purely domestic implications.  The 
framework that should guide the Court’s references, and those of the judiciary as a whole, 
to non-American legal authorities or international conventions, then, is simple – courts 
should never use such sources to any degree in instances where the specific disputes they 
consider, whether in the facts they involve or the laws they concern, do not actually 
necessitate such a reference under the Constitution.
I) THE SUPREME COURT’S USE OF NON-AMERICAN LEGAL MATERIALS
The Supreme Court has referred to foreign sources of law and international 
conventions in three specific types of cases.  The first involves disputes over the meaning 
of treaties that the United States has ratified, where the Court has considered foreign 
court decisions interpreting the same treaty provisions a case it faces involves.  The Court 
has also heard cases that do not involve a specific treaty, but that nonetheless involve 
some sort of foreign interest.  Some federal appellate court decisions regarding these 
same situations have also gained prominence in recent years, with the issues they raise 
having the potential to reach the Court.  All of these latter disputes have primarily 
included questions concerning American statutory implementations of international law, 
matters that indirectly implicate international law issues on account of how one of the 
10
parties to the litigation comes from a foreign country or how the law at issue exerts some 
sort of effect on commerce with foreign states or another country’s domestic practices.  
More importantly, the Court has only considered non-U.S. legal perspectives to be 
advisory, and not binding, authorities.  Perhaps Chief Justice John Marshall best outlined 
this method of decisionmaking in the 1815 case of Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle: 
“The decisions of the Courts of every country, so far as they are founded upon a law 
common to every country, will be received, not as authority, but with respect.”18
But the Court has increasingly referred to non-U.S. law and inapplicable 
international conventions as persuasive authority in cases raising no implications beyond 
concrete domestic matters.  The laws at issue in these cases have all been American 
statutes of some sort.  The parties have all been resident in the United States.  The facts of 
these cases have not involved any event that occurred outside of American borders.  
Consequently, these rulings are themselves unprecedented.
A) Interpreting Treaties
Article VI of the Constitution requires courts to decide disputes concerning 
obligations under a ratified treaty according to that treaty’s pertinent provisions.19  And 
just as the Supreme Court often considers American legislation with an ambiguous 
meaning, it sometimes considers sections of treaties under the same circumstance.  So if a 
court in another country that is a party to the treaty has examined the same part of the 
treaty the Court must interpret, and if the Court can find no guidance from any American 
18 Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. 191, 198 (1815)(affirming a lower court’s decision to 
condemn the claimant’s sugar as enemy property because the United States had captured the sugar while 
raiding a British vessel that had docked on an island, which was British territory, where the claimant had a 
plantation).
19 U.S. CONST. art. VI (“[A]ll treaties made.…under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme 
law of the land.”).
11
legal source, the foreign court’s view of the treaty may at least provide a very useful 
perspective on what the provision in question means.  To this effect, the Court has stated 
that in interpreting a treaty, it is not only appropriate to refer to the records of its drafting 
or negotiations, but also to grant “considerable weight” to the interpretations of “sister 
signatories.”20
Medellin, if decided in the petitioner’s favor, and in spite of policymakers’ 
apparent fear of how such a development might damage American sovereignty, would 
arguably constitute such an instance, given how the case concerns a convention that the 
U.S. recognized at one time. In addition, that same principle has influenced the Court’s 
case law concerning the 1929 Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
Relating to International Transportation by Air.  In El Al Airlines v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, the 
Court precluded a passenger’s tort action against an airline concerning an intrusive 
security search that resulted in psychosomatic injuries.21  The issue underlying the 
dispute entailed whether the search constituted an “accident” under the meaning of the 
treaty, given that airline personnel had mistakenly detained and searched the passenger as 
a suspected terrorist.  In an 8-1 decision concluding that the treaty did not encompass the 
scenario at hand, the Court referred to decisions by the British House of Lords, the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia, the New Zealand Court of Appeal, and the 
Singapore Court of Appeal which addressed similar issues.22
And in Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, the Court precluded recovery by a group of 
airline passengers who sued for mental distress stemming from their plane’s narrow 
20
 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985).
21
 El Al Airlines v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
22 Id. at 176.
12
avoidance of a crash.23  The Court conducted an extensive review of the Convention’s 
history and terms, as well as one of French statutory and case law because “the 
Convention was drafted in French by continental jurists.”24 In the end, the only foreign 
case encompassing a similar fact situation that the Court found involved the Supreme 
Court of Israel, whose decision allowed recovery for mental distress related to aircraft 
problems.  The U.S. Supreme Court, however, held that it was “not persuaded by that 
court’s reasoning” because the Convention’s legal history and terms indicated no support 
for lawsuits based on “psychic injuries.”25  This line of reasoning followed the lead set 
forth in Air France by looking to foreign legal sources for guidance in interpreting the 
Warsaw Convention.  However, the Court eventually applied Marshall’s approach in 
Thirty Hogsheads in not letting the contents of those sources preclude a supposedly 
proper resolution of the matter.     
Another instance in which the Court may have to resort to foreign legal 
perspectives in the future concerns the Convention for the International Sale of Goods 
(C.I.S.G.), “an international form of the Uniform Commercial Code” consisting of 62 
signatory nations that governs the sale of goods between parties in different states.26  The 
rise in cross-border transactions over the past few years has increased the number of 
C.I.S.G. cases U.S. courts have faced, resulting in an unsuccessful motion for a writ of 
certiorari from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals requesting clarification of the term 
“considerable weight” as stated in Air France.27  The decision the motion concerned 
23
 Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
24 Id. at 536.
25 Id. at 550-51.
26 See Javier H. Rubinstein, Global Litigation: International Law’s New Importance in the U.S., NAT’L L.J., 
Sept. 15, 2003, at 16.
27
 Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., 313 F.3d 385 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 
124 S. Ct. 803 (2003).
13
involved the C.I.S.G., but did not cite any foreign court opinions itself.28  Nevertheless, 
other U.S. courts have discussed foreign court decisions in interpreting the C.I.S.G.29
Medellin and the cases concerning the Warsaw Convention and the C.I.S.G. have 
occurred in the context of treaties to which the United States has agreed.  U.S. courts 
may, therefore, legitimately look to how foreign courts have interpreted these same 
treaties.  And their willingness in some of these instances to use such rulings on a strictly 
advisory basis should certainly quell any fears that such references might dilute American 
sovereignty in the manner that Lawrence and Roper arguably illustrated.
B) Disputes Indirectly Concerning International Law Or External Interests
The Court has also utilized foreign sources in order to interpret questions of U.S. 
law, or supported the practice of doing so, in cases involving foreign interests or 
instances that raise questions of international law more indirectly. A foreign government 
or entity may have interests in a given dispute as a party to the resulting litigation.  A 
dispute may also involve a subject area to which international law is relevant or an 
American statute that implements a provision of international law.  Throughout the 
nineteenth century, cases where the Court referred to non-U.S. sources of law primarily 
involved these circumstances.  
Yet in more recent years, the increased ease of trade and travel among nations has 
made such statutes that implement international law provisions as the 1976 Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (F.S.I.A.) necessary.  In addition, lower courts have displayed 
a renewed interest in older such statutes as the 1789 Alien Tort Claims Act (A.T.C.A.).  
28 Id.
29
 Rubinstein, supra note 26, citing Usinor Industeel v. Leeco Steel Prods., Inc., 209 F.Supp 2d 880, 886 
(N.D. Ill. 2002); Medical Marketing Intern. Inc. v. Internazionale Medico Scientifica SRL, 1999 WL 
311945, at *2 (E.D. La. 1999); St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Neuromed Medical Sys. & Support GmbH, 
2002 WL 465312 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
14
Cases arising under these two laws often implicate considerations of international law in 
some form, thereby possibly making non-U.S. legal materials or international 
conventions relevant.  But consistent with its practice in the cases concerning actual 
treaties, the Court has not given binding or persuasive effect to such sources at U.S. 
authorities’ general and overall expense.
The Court’s 1816 decision in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee was one of the first 
instances where it recognized that foreign legal sources might bear relevance in areas that 
could possibly raise implications of international law.  Citing such subjects as admiralty 
law and the law concerning jurisdiction over diplomats, Justice Joseph Story maintained 
that “the principles of the law and comity of nations often form[ed] an essential inquiry” 
in matters where foreign nations were “deeply interested.”30
Professor Vicki Jackson of the Georgetown University Law Center has 
documented how the Court looked to “understandings of the law and practice of other 
nations” in reaching “correct interpretations of the U.S. Constitution” and in “resolving 
particular controversies.”31  Her study mentions how Chief Justice John Marshall 
considered general concepts of the law governing treaties in evaluating the status of 
Indian tribes under the Constitution32 and how Chief Justice Roger Taney considered the 
extradition practices of other countries in determining whether the Constitution precluded 
a fugitive’s extradition to Canada.33  In resolving particular admiralty disputes, the Court 
referred to “the usages and received obligations of the civilized world” to preclude the 
30
 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 335 (1816).
31 Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On the Constitution of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 108th Congress 2-3 (2004)(statement 
of Professor Vicki Jackson, Georgetown University Law Center).
32 Id. at 3, citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 US 515, 560-61 (1832).
33 Id., citing Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 569-73 (1840).
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seizure of a foreign vessel in a U.S. port.34  More notably, Chief Justice Marshall 
articulated how “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of 
nations if any other possible construction exists.”35  In all of these instances, the Court 
emphasized the importance of acknowledging international law only to the extent it was 
consistent with the U.S. law governing the specific dispute.  
By the end of the nineteenth century, the Court came to summarize this general 
framework in the seminal case of The Paquete Habana, which concerned two boats 
belonging to Spanish citizens that the United States seized as “prizes” in a naval blockade 
imposed during the Spanish-American War.  In ruling that the seizures lacked probable 
cause and violated international law, the Court held:
International law is part of American law, and must be ascertained and administered by 
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending 
upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no 
treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be 
had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works 
of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have made 
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works 
are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning 
what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.36
This holding bears significance because proponents of the internationalist approach to 
constitutional interpretation often cite this statement in claiming that the Court has always 
unconditionally approved of referring to foreign law in decisionmaking concerning 
domestic issues.37  Indeed, one critic of the internationalist approach, Center for Strategic 
and International Studies fellow Laurence E. Rothenberg, has gone so far as to call this 
34 Id., citing The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 137-46 (1812).
35 Id., citing Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
36
 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
37 See, e.g., Harold Koh, Agora: The United States Constitution And International Law – International Law 
As Part Of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L. LAW 43, 44 (2004) (“Perhaps the Court was suggesting that, in an 
interdependent world, United States courts should not decide cases without paying ‘a decent respect to the 
opinions of mankind, in the memorable words of the Declaration of Independence.”).
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decision “an icon for international activists and internationalist scholars.”38  Given the 
context in which the Court made the statement, however, the Paquete Habana decision 
really did not imply any such approval.  
The Court’s qualification following the phrase “international law is part of our 
law” is most important – the Court held that international law applied in U.S. courts only 
“where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial 
decision.”  Simply put, international law can, to borrow a contract law term, serve as an 
effective “gap filler” when a court cannot find a domestic rule to guide its deliberations.  
Unfortunately, as Mr. Rothenberg has noted, it is quite notable that “those citing The 
Paquete Habana generally end at [the first sentence] and go on to assert far-ranging 
claims for application of international law in U.S. courts.”39
More significantly, the Court’s decision in the case upon which this much quoted 
holding was based, Hilton v. Guyot, also held that courts should only refer to non-U.S. 
legal materials in adjudicating disputes with specific international law implications and 
only do so to the extent that U.S. law did not provide adequate guidance towards 
resolving the question at hand.40  The Court stated:
International law, in its widest and most comprehensive sense -- including not only 
questions of right between nations, governed by what has been appropriately called the 
law of nations; but also questions arising under what is usually called private 
38
 Laurence E. Rothenberg, International Law, U.S. Sovereignty, and the Death Penalty, 35 GEO. J. INT’L. 
L. 547 (2004).
39 Id., citing Brief of Amicus Curiae International Law Expert in Support of Petitioners, at 4, Rasul.  See 
also supra note 32 (Koh begins his article as follows: “What did the United States Supreme Court mean 
when it famously said, ‘International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by 
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly 
presented for their determination’?”).
40
 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 113.  This case concerned the extent to which the United States should recognize 
foreign court decisions and involved defendants – American citizens - in a French contract case.  The 
French courts had ruled against them, leading the French plaintiffs to file an action to collect damages in 
the United States.  But the U.S. Supreme Court found that comity was reciprocal. Because France did not 
recognize final judgments of the United States, and would try such judgments anew, French judgments 
should be given the same treatment. 
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international law, or the conflict of laws, and concerning the rights of persons within the 
territory and dominion of one nation, by reason of acts, private or public, done within the 
dominions of another nation -- is part of our law, and must be ascertained and 
administered by the courts of justice, as often as such questions are presented in litigation 
between man and man, duly submitted to their determination.  The most certain guide, no 
doubt, for the decision of such questions is a treaty or a statute of this country. 41
The Court defined the preservation of American sovereignty as a paramount goal when 
confronted with the dilemma of making a decision without adequate domestic legal 
guidance.  In general, then, the Court viewed non-U.S. law as a supplement to, and not as 
a potential replacement of, American laws and legal traditions.  The Court continued:
But when, as is the case here, there is no written law upon the subject, the duty still rests 
upon the judicial tribunals of ascertaining and declaring what the law is, whenever it 
becomes necessary to do so, in order to determine the rights of parties to suits regularly 
brought before them. In doing this, the courts must obtain such aid as they can from 
judicial decisions, from the works of jurists and commentators, and from the acts and 
usages of civilized nations.42
The Court went on to clarify that the decision to apply foreign or international law lay at 
its own discretion.  Basic principles of sovereignty meant that even when confronted with 
a case explicitly encompassing international interests or questions of foreign law, the 
Court could refuse to set aside American law, especially if American law provided a 
satisfactory framework for resolving the issue at hand.  
So the Court may have accepted the concept of considering whether to apply 
foreign law within American borders because of the need, in order to sustain positive 
foreign relations, to acknowledge the specific state’s own legitimacy as a nation.  The 
Court held:
Comity is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy 
and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its 
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard 
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of 
other persons who are under the protection of its laws.43
41 Id. at 163.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 163-64.
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But at the same time, the Court prioritized between American law and foreign law in 
favor of the former.  The Court noted:
Comity is, and ever must be, uncertain; that it must necessarily depend on a variety of 
circumstances which cannot be reduced to any certain rule; that no nation will suffer the 
laws of another to interfere with her own to the injury of her citizens; that whether they 
do or not must depend on the condition of the country in which the foreign law is sought 
to be enforced, the particular nature of her legislation, her policy, and the character of her 
institutions; that in the conflict of laws it must often be a matter of doubt which should 
prevail; and that, whenever a doubt does exist, the court, which decides, will prefer the 
laws of its own country to that of the stranger."44
Both Hilton and The Paquete Habana, then, articulated Marshall’s conception from the 
Thirty Hogsheads case of the use of non-American legal sources in further detail – such 
materials could provide useful perspectives in some cases, especially in matters 
concerning such international law or relations issues as comity. But foreign law never 
merited definitive weight at U.S. law’s expense.45
The Court continued this same approach as the body of statutory law 
implementing provisions of international law, such as the F.S.I.A. increased.  The 
F.S.I.A. entitled foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of courts in the United 
States, subject to certain enumerated exceptions.46  In a decision concerning one such 
exception, which provided that a foreign state was not immune from suit in any case 
where the action stemmed from a commercial activity directly affecting the United 
States, the Court referred to an Italian court case solely for assistance in defining what 
44 Id. at 164-65.
45
 This article will assume that The Paquete Habana remains valid law.  However, it is worth noting that 
some scholars have questioned this very validity in the wake of the Court’s later conclusion that federal 
courts have no authority to create “general common law.”  See supra note 37 n.83, citing Erie Railroad v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary, International Law as 
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Daniel J. 
Meltzer, Customary International Law, Foreign Affairs, and Federal Common Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L. L. 
513, 519.  Mr. Rothenberg has also noted the work of scholars opposing this conclusion.  Supra note 37 n. 
83, citing Harold Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998).
46
 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C.A § 1604 (2003).
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constituted cross-border “commercial activity.”47  In an earlier dispute concerning a tort 
action by the owner of a Liberian oil tanker against Argentina for having bombed the ship 
in international waters, despite its non-combatant status during the Falklands War, the 
Court referred to treaties governing what and where nations could recover under similar 
circumstances in concluding that U.S. courts had no subject matter jurisdiction over the 
dispute.48
American courts, in another instance that may yet receive Supreme Court 
attention, have also referred to foreign legal perspectives in cases concerning the 
A.T.C.A., which gives American courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action by an 
alien for tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”49  In a 1980 ruling that drew criticism from some originalist or conservative legal 
scholars,50 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld an award of damages to a 
group of Paraguayan plaintiffs residing in the U.S. for the torture and murder in Paraguay 
of a relative by a Paraguayan police official.51  The court referred to numerous 
international conventions in concluding that the “law of nations” prohibited official 
torture, thereby further justifying the suit under the Act.52
But for the most part, following the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eastern Airlines lead, 
courts have not hesitated to use their discretion to refer to foreign legal sources and 
47
 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614-615 (1992).
48
 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 US 428, 442-43 (1989).
49
 Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (2003).
50 See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 25 (AEI Press 2003), 
citing JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS (AEI Press 1998)(“The court, as Professor Jeremy 
Rabkin put it, ‘cheered on by a host of international law scholars, insisted…that ‘customary international 
law’ has greatly expanded and now incorporates an international law of human rights.’….These suits do not 
really seek recompense; rather, they aspire to make a propaganda point appear more compelling by the 
decision of a U.S. court.”).
51
 Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
52 Id. at 884.
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disregard them if they feel doing so is necessary.  In Ullonoa Flores v. Southern Peru 
Copper Corp., the Second Circuit held that treaties and non-binding declarations of the 
United Nations General Assembly were not adequate evidence of customary international 
law in an unsuccessful suit by Peruvian plaintiffs for deaths supposedly resulting from 
the defendant company’s pollution.53  Specifically, the court held that “because United 
Nations General Assembly documents are at best merely advisory, they do not, on their 
own and without proof of uniform state practice, evidence an intent by member states to 
be legally bound by their principles, and thus cannot give rise to rules of customary 
international law for purposes of the Alien Tort Claims Act.”54
International law issues, then, became pertinent in these cases through the nature 
of the facts involved.  The courts did not raise these questions or consult foreign legal 
materials on their own.  Yet these cases presented an overall picture of courts that 
remained willing to disregard foreign legal perspectives if they felt that those 
perspectives would not lead to an analysis or result consistent with American legal 
traditions.  This more restrained approach to using foreign legal materials sharply 
contrasts with the approach evident in a series of Supreme Court decisions, primarily 
during the last fifty years or so, which have primarily involved purely domestic social 
issues.   
C) The Supreme Court’s Internationalist Decisions
Roper and Lawrence have exemplified the decisions this accelerating 
internationalist trend encompasses.  The general method by which the Court has applied 
foreign legal authorities or international conventions in this regard is rather consistent.  
53
 Ullonoa Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003).
54 Id. at 167.
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The facts and issues of a given case generally pertain to a question of what the 
Constitution means in some respect.  The case involves no foreign interests or issues of 
non-U.S. law or international law directly or indirectly.  And yet the Court still refers to 
some foreign court decision or law or international convention the U.S. has not ratified as 
a reason to adopt one constitutional interpretation over another.  Normally, the non-U.S. 
legal source is cited in some claim about a consensus within the “world community” or 
“community of nations” in favor of viewing a specific issue in a given context.  Such a 
perspective, then, supposedly outlines why a particular approach to the facts and issues 
underlying the case is correct.
The greater significance of this line of reasoning involves the message the Court 
implies.  In these decisions, the Court usually gives no reason for why a particular source 
pertains to the issue at hand, beyond articulating foreign and international law’s general 
relevance.  It simply lists the source and the principle it outlines in articulating its 
reasoning in favor of the ultimate decision.  The Court, therefore, seems to believe the 
following – that because this foreign law or these specific countries take a given approach 
to an issue, the United States should take the same approach to the same matter.  In other 
words, the Court gives foreign legal perspectives far more persuasive weight than it does 
in its lines of decisions that more directly involve international law or foreign interests.  
This apparent deference to foreign legal authorities or inapplicable treaties in the wake of 
making decisions that do not require their use constitutes the crux of the concern many 
observers have expressed about Roper, Lawrence, and similar cases, especially given 
how these disputes often involve bitterly debated constitutional issues.  Consequently, 
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several questions about how this practice will ultimately affect the Constitution’s status 
as the ultimate arbiter of every American legal dispute remain.
Foreign law played a role in Supreme Court decisions not relating to external 
interests far before Roper and Lawrence were decided.  Professor Gerald Neuman of 
Columbia Law School recently described how “foreign law played a well-known role in 
the debates over the relationship between the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”55  In fact, Professor Neuman highlighted a series of cases not pertaining to 
foreign interests where the Court seemed to acknowledge how foreign law could provide 
useful, but not binding, perspectives for use in American constitutional interpretation.  In 
the 1884 decision of Hurtado v. California, for example, the Court held:
While we take just pride in the principles and institutions of the common law, we are not 
to forget that in lands where other systems of jurisprudence prevail, the ideas and 
processes of civil justice are also not unknown…There is nothing in the Magna Carta, 
rightly construed as a broad charter of public right and law, which ought to exclude the 
best ideas of all systems and of every age; and as it was the characteristic principle of the 
common law to draw its inspiration from every fountain of justice, we are not to assume 
that the sources of its supply have been exhausted.56
But the approach the Court applied in Lawrence, Roper, and the other “internationalist” 
decisions of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries began to take place more 
frequently in cases during the tenure of Chief Justice Earl Warren concerning the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual” punishment.
In the 1958 decision of Trop v. Dulles, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment 
did not permit the government to rescind a person’s citizenship as punishment for a 
55
 Gerald Neuman, Agora: The United States Constitution And International Law – The Uses of 
International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L. LAW 82, 83 (2004), citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 
& n.3 (1937)(analogously referring to “continental Europe[‘s]” sanction of compulsory self-incrimination 
in affirming a death sentence because a state statute allowing a new trial in a criminal case did not violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on double jeopardy, so long as the new trial was meant to ensure 
a hearing free of legal error), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
56 Id., quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884)(upholding a murder prosecution 
commencing by information and not indictment as consistent with minimum due process).
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crime.57  The majority opinion by Chief Justice Warren specifically referred to how “the 
international community of democracy” had rejected denationalization as a form of 
punishment for crimes.  It extensively cited foreign laws concerning the issue as an 
additional policy reason for interpreting the Eighth Amendment to preclude the 
punishment in question.  Warren wrote:
The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be 
imposed as punishment for crime. It is true that several countries prescribe expatriation in 
the event that their nationals engage in conduct in derogation of native allegiance. Even 
statutes of this sort are generally applicable primarily to naturalized citizens. But use of 
denationalization as punishment for crime is an entirely different matter. The United 
Nations' survey of the nationality laws of 84 nations of the world reveals that only two 
countries, the Philippines and Turkey, impose denationalization as a penalty for 
desertion. In this country the Eighth Amendment forbids this to be done.58
Perhaps one could say that this case belongs in the category of disputes explicitly 
concerning foreign interests.  After all, many of those cases also involved the treatment of 
foreign-born individuals.  But the underlying issue – the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
on “cruel and unusual” punishment – was wholly domestically oriented.  The decision, 
then, began a more definite Supreme Court trend towards using foreign laws as 
persuasive authority in resolving constitutional disputes with purely domestic 
implications.
This practice was not confined to majority opinions.  In Schneider v. Rusk, which 
invalidated a law allowing the State Department to revoke the citizenship of naturalized 
citizens who had resided in a foreign country for a certain amount of time, the Court held 
that the same law unconstitutionally assumed that naturalized citizens as a class were less 
reliable and bore less allegiance to the U.S. than did the native born, thereby violating 
57
 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
58 Id. at 102-03.
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due process under the Fifth Amendment.59  But a dissent by Justice Tom Clark appeared 
to imply that since a significant number of foreign countries had similar laws in place, 
perhaps having one in the United States would also have been reasonable.  Justice Clark 
noted:
Nor is the United States alone in making residence abroad cause for expatriation. 
Although the number of years of foreign residence varies from 2 to 10 years, 29 
countries, including the United Kingdom and 7 Commonwealth countries, expatriate 
naturalized citizens residing abroad. Only four -- Czechoslovakia, Poland, Afghanistan, 
and Yugoslavia -- apply expatriation to both native-born and naturalized citizens. Even 
the United Nations sanctions different treatment for naturalized and native-born citizens; 
Article 7 of the United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness provides 
that naturalized citizens who reside abroad for seven years may be expatriated unless they 
declare their intent to retain citizenship.60
Trop and Schneider, therefore, illustrate an interest on a number of justices’ parts, in 
majority opinions and in dissents, towards looking to foreign legal perspectives in 
evaluating questions about domestic criminal punishment.  And the opinions and dissents 
in these respective cases seemed to encourage references to foreign laws when those 
same laws facilitated the result certain judges appeared to want.  
In a later case, the Court went even further in its use of foreign sources.  The 
Court faced the question, to which a majority answered in the affirmative, of whether the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual” punishment applied to capital 
punishment in the United States in the 1972 case of Furman v. Georgia.61  A concurring 
opinion by Justice William O. Douglas actually used a reference to the term “cruel and 
unusual” in a non-American legal document, the 1689 English Bill of Rights, to conclude 
the following:
The words "cruel and unusual" certainly include penalties that are barbaric. But the 
words, at least when read in light of the English proscription against selective and 
irregular use of penalties, suggest that it is "cruel and unusual" to apply the death penalty 
59
 Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
60 Id. at 174 (Clark, J., dissenting).
61
 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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- or any other penalty - selectively to minorities whose numbers are few, who are outcasts 
of society, and who are unpopular, but whom society is willing to see suffer though it 
would not countenance general application of the same penalty across the board.62
Justice Douglas’s use of the 1689 English Bill of Rights to justify his conclusion that 
American courts imposed the death penalty arbitrarily on the basis of race bears 
significance.  Simply put, he used a foreign document of over 350 years of age, albeit one 
to which American constitutional documents were closely related, not just to determine 
the Framers’ intended meaning for the phrase, but to go beyond such an analysis in 
developing a meaning for the phrase that accounted for the circumstances they probably 
did not view in the same light.63  And while Douglas’s analysis of capital punishment did 
not prevail in the end on account of the Court’s decision to reinstate the death penalty 
four years later,64 it continued a barely noticeable trend on Supreme Court justices’ parts 
of giving very persuasive effect to laws that technically did not apply to the United 
States. 
The 1977 decision of Coker v. Georgia, which invalidated the imposition of 
capital punishment for rape, followed the example the Court set in Trop and explicitly 
discussed the importance of how other nations had followed a similar path.  One footnote 
stated:
In Trop v. Dulles (citation omitted), the plurality took pains to note the climate of 
international opinion concerning the acceptability of a particular punishment. It is thus 
not irrelevant here that out of 60 major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 
retained the death penalty for rape where death did not ensue.65
62 Id. at 244-45 (Douglas, J., concurring).
63
 Given the greater use of capital punishment and the prevalence of slavery in the U.S. at the time the Bill 
of Rights was enacted, it is difficult to substantiate a claim that a majority of the Framers adhered to a view 
of racial justice as understood in a twentieth or twenty-first century context.
64
 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)(Court held that states has successfully satisfied the reservations 
about capital punishment expressed in Furman with updated laws to this effect).
65
 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977).
26
The Court did the same in Enmund v. Florida, where it forbade the imposition of the 
death penalty for vicarious felony murder.66  In a footnote similar to the one in Coker
referring to foreign perspectives on the death penalty, the Court held:
[The] climate of international opinion concerning the acceptability of a particular 
punishment" is an additional consideration which is "not irrelevant.” It is thus worth 
noting that the doctrine of felony murder has been abolished in England and India, 
severely restricted in Canada and a number of other Commonwealth countries, and is 
unknown in continental Europe.67
In turn, Justice John Paul Stevens cited both Enmund and Coker in the 1988 decision of 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, where the Court held that the Eighth Amendment precluded the 
execution of individuals under the age of fifteen.  Specifically, his majority opinion held: 
“We have previously recognized the relevance of the views of the international 
community in determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.”68  He continued 
to list a number of nations, primarily in Western Europe, that had abolished the death 
penalty for most, if not all crimes.69
The bulk of the Court’s decisions and dissents utilizing foreign legal principles in 
this manner during the 1980’s and 1990’s generally involved capital punishment.  In fact, 
most of these references consisted of documenting how countries in the European Union 
had abolished the death penalty in order to show why the United States should at least 
restrict its use.  Justice William Brennan made one such reference in his dissent in 
Stanford v. Kentucky, where the Court allowed the imposition of the death penalty on 
defendants over the age of sixteen.70  More recently, however, the Court acknowledged 
the view that the “world community” condemned the execution of the mentally retarded 
66
 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
67 Id. at 796 n.22.
68
 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988)(Stevens, J., concurring).
69 Id. n.34.
70
 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 390 (1989)(Brennan, J., dissenting)., overruled by Roper, 2005 
U.S.LEXIS 2200 at *1.
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by citing to only one amicus brief filed by European Union representatives.  That 
decision, Atkins v. Virginia, prohibited states from executing individuals who were 
mentally disabled in some way when they committed their crimes.71
In the 1990’s, the Court began to refer to foreign laws in a much wider array of 
cases.  It also began to cite international conventions, including some the U.S. had not 
ratified.  Some of these references specifically occurred in individual concurring 
opinions.  In Printz v. United States, Justice Stephen Breyer outlined his view that foreign 
concepts of federalism “may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of 
different solutions to a common legal problem.”72  And in his concurrence in Nixon v. 
Shrink Missouri Government PAC, which upheld state campaign finance limitations 
under the First Amendment, Breyer cited decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada and 
the European Court of Human Rights (E.C.H.R.) in comparing American courts’ 
approach to the issue with “that of other constitutional courts facing similar complex 
constitutional problems.”73
In voting against their more internationalist colleagues, more “conservative” 
justices apparently registered their general displeasure with these developments.  
Nonetheless, even these justices cited foreign practices in support of their views, albeit in 
exceptional instances, and not with the same degrees of attempted persuasiveness.74
In any event, a central reason why observers probably noticed this 
internationalism on the Court’s part later rather than sooner probably had to do with the 
71
 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
72
 Printz v.United States, 521 U.S. 897, 977 (1997)(federal gun control laws could not require state officials 
to enforce federal policies)(Breyer, J., dissenting).
73
 Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 403 (2000)(Breyer, J., concurring).
74 See supra note 7; McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 381 (1995)(Scalia,J., 
dissenting)(citing practices of Australia, Canada, and England in dissenting from a decision striking down a 
state law requiring the publishers of political campaign pamphlets to identify themselves).
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fact that two of the latest decisions to this effect involved highly publicized cases on two 
“hot button” issues - affirmative action and homosexual rights.  In their concurrence in 
Grutter v. Bollinger, which upheld the narrowly tailored use of race as a factor in 
university admissions decisions, which universities successfully claimed was crucial to 
furthering a compelling interest in obtaining racial diversity’s educational benefits, 
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg cited the provisions of the 1965 International (United 
Nations) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in further 
supporting the Court’s decision.  They noted how the Convention endorsed “special and 
concrete measures to ensure the adequate development and protection of certain racial 
groups or individuals belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full 
and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”  More significantly, 
the concurrence also referred to the 1979 United Nations (U.N.) Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which the United States had 
in fact not ratified, as well.75
Finally, the Court made one of its two most famous references to foreign legal 
sources to date in Lawrence.  That reference consisted of an earlier decision by the 
E.C.H.R. holding that sodomy laws were unnecessary to the protection of public health or 
morals and Britain’s statutory legalization of homosexual activity.  Again, the discussion 
of the E.C.H.R. decision and British law was not crucial to the Court’s decision, which 
focused on the validity of sodomy laws under the U.S. Constitution.76  But in utilizing 
75
 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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 The reasoning in Lawrence consisted of three primary prongs – 1) because stare decisis was flexible, 
there was no individual or societal reliance on Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court’s seminal 1986 precedent 
that had upheld the criminalization of homosexual sodomy, that counseled against overruling it in the wake 
of compelling reasons to do so; 2) Bowers demeaned the lives of homosexual persons as consenting adults; 
and 3) a compelling state interest did not trump the right of privacy in this case.  The reference to foreign 
law comprised a part of the first and second prongs in terms of providing evidence that the statute in 
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such a source anyway, the Court appeared to acknowledge the usefulness of such 
materials as persuasive authority.  Notably, Justice Kennedy wrote: “The sweeping 
references by Chief Justice [Warren] Burger [in Bowers v. Hardwick]77 to the history of 
Western civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards did not take 
account of other authorities pointing in an opposite direction.”  Justice Kennedy then 
cited Britain’s 1967 legalization of homosexuality and the E.C.H.R. decision.78  In doing 
so, he seemed to criticize Bowers for having upheld bans on homosexual sodomy simply 
to follow certain cultural norms, even though those norms were, in his view, inaccurate.  
But after finding sources of foreign law that he felt were more appropriate, without 
explaining why from a constitutional standpoint, Kennedy followed the same lead.
Those who became skeptical of the Lawrence decision in this respect probably 
found little solace in subsequent statements by some justices, which assumed a 
perspective to the effect of the United States needing to, in a sense, “learn” from other 
countries.  In one speech, Justice Ginsburg stated: “We are the losers if we do not both 
share our experience with, and learn from others.”79  In referring to the Lawrence 
decision, she publicly argued that the United States’s “island or lone ranger mentality 
[was] beginning to change.”80  Justice O’Connor presented a similar view when she 
stated that “there is much to learn from…distinguished jurists [in the rest of the world] 
question was outmoded in the context of social norms and demeaned the lives of homosexual persons given 
how other nations had legalized the practice.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78.
77
 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)(criminalization of sodomy upheld because the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause did not create a fundamental right for homosexual persons to engage in 
consensual sodomy, even in the privacy of their own homes), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
78
 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573, citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 52 (1981); Sexual 
Offences Act, 1967, § 1. 
79Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks for the American Constitution Society (August 2, 2003).
80 Id.
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who have given thought to the same difficult issues that we face here.”81  And in spite of 
his dissent in Lawrence, perhaps even Chief Justice Rehnquist might be, or at least may 
have been at one time, receptive to this same trend.  He once claimed: “But now that 
constitutional law is solidly grounded in so many countries, it is time that the United 
States courts begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their 
own deliberative process.”82
The saying that one should what watch what one does and not what one says may 
add a useful perspective here.  The justices’ statements are seemingly innocuous.  But 
when one examines the wording of Lawrence, and that of such similar decisions as Trop
or Atkins, one implication becomes apparent.  In referring to foreign laws and court 
decisions when the issues surrounding a case do not involve any sort of external 
implication, the Court seems to view the sources it selects as persuasive.  Lawrence and 
these other “internationalist” cases were not instances where the Court needed to look to 
foreign law because American law pertaining to the subject at hand was unavailable or 
because the cases somehow involved non-American interests.  Instead, the Court seemed 
to imply that the perspectives of countries that approached a given issue from the same 
point of view it sought to apply should be given persuasive effect.  In essence, the Court 
used foreign direction to influence a domestic result.  And while not using foreign 
sources probably would not have changed the outcome in any of these cases, the Court 
81 Id., quoting Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address Before the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the 
American Society of International Law (March 16, 2002), in 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 348, 350 
(2002).
82 Id., quoting William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts – Comparative Remarks (1989), reprinted in 
GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE – A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411, 
412 (Paul Kirchof & Donald P. Kommers eds. 1993).
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set a precedent for more extensive use of such materials in the future, as Roper 
evidenced.
III) The Post – Lawrence Debate and Roper
Roper constitutes the first “internationalist” decision to have occurred in the 
context of a clear debate in the legal academy and the media on this decisionmaking 
approach’s appropriateness under the Constitution.  Certainly, the reference to foreign 
court decisions and statutes in Lawrence exemplifies a documented tendency on some 
foreign courts’ parts to justify their decisions with references to other countries’ laws, a 
trend that Robert Bork has called “the international homogenization of constitutional 
law.”83  Nonetheless, Lawrence galvanized members of Congress and other observers 
who felt that non-U.S. legal perspectives had no place in the process of constitutional 
interpretation beyond the role the Constitution explicitly prescribed.
A number of editorials to this effect soon appeared in the media.84  And, during 
the summer following Lawrence, critics of the decision in the House of Representatives 
offered a resolution expressing similar concerns.  The proposed Feeney-Goodblatte 
Resolution, or House Resolution 568, declared:
It is the sense of the House of Representatives that judicial determinations regarding the 
meaning of the laws of the United States should not be based in whole or in part on 
judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such foreign 
judgments, laws or pronouncements are incorporated into the legislative history of laws 
passed by the elected legislative branches of the United States or otherwise inform an 
understanding of the original meaning of the laws of the United States.85
83 See ROBERT BORK , COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 24 (2003)(citing decisions by 
the supreme courts of Canada and Israel); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Use of International Law in Judicial 
Decisions, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 423, 427, citing S. AFR. CONST. § 39(1)(“When interpreting the 
[South African] Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal, or forum….(b) must consider international law; and (c) 
may consider foreign law.”).
84 See, e.g., Phyllis Schlafly, International Law Should Not Trump The Constitution, Human Events Online, 
Nov. 4, 2004, at http://www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=5665 (last visited Jan. 1, 2005); 
Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFFAIRS, July-Aug. 2004, at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/feature_posner_julaug04.html.
85
 Feeney-Goodblatte Resolution, H.R. 568, 108th Cong. (2004).
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Congressman Steve Chabot (R-Ohio), chairman of the Judiciary Committee’s 
Subcommittee on the Constitution, later stated that this resolution was necessary because 
of “an alarming new trend” of “judges reaching beyond even their own imaginations to 
the decisions of foreign institutions to justify their decisions.”86  In fact, Chabot even 
quoted the news commentator Stuart Taylor’s sarcastic observation on Justice Ginsburg’s 
reference to the 1979 U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women in her Grutter concurrence: “If an international 
agreement that the United States has refused to ratify can be invoked as a guide to the 
meaning of the 136-year-old Fourteenth Amendment, what will be next?  Constitutional 
interpretation based on the sayings of Chairman Mao? Or Barbara Streisand?”87
Of the Court’s members, only Justices Scalia and Thomas have explicitly stated 
their opposition to the Court’s internationalist approach to decisionmaking.88  Other 
prominent legal scholars such as Judge Richard Posner have joined Scalia in expressing 
comparable skepticism.89  In contrast, whether by voting or making speeches, Justices 
Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer have each called for greater 
engagement of non-U.S. legal sources at some point.  And a number of well-known 
international law experts have joined these three justices.  For example, Dean Harold Koh 
of the Yale Law School90 and Professors Jackson91 and Neuman92 have praised the 
86 Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On the Constitution of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 108th Congress 1 (2004)(statement 
of Rep. Chabot, Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary).
87 Id. at 3.
88 See supra notes 6-7.
89
 Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFFAIRS, July-Aug. 2004, at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/feature_posner_julaug04.html.
90 See Koh, Agora: The United States Constitution And International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L. LAW at 43 
(January 2004).
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Court’s acknowledgement of foreign legal points of view on homosexuality, affirmative 
action, and the death penalty in Lawrence, Grutter, and Atkins respectively.
Consequently, over the course of this and the last term, the Court has witnessed a 
noticeable increase in the number of advocates explicitly calling for viewing foreign laws 
and international conventions as binding authority in specific disputes.93  And it is the 
Court’s acknowledgement of these arguments in Roper that have brought this issue its 
current prominence beyond legal academic circles.    
Roper, which was argued this past October, concerned a Missouri death row 
inmate who was 17 at the time of his arrest for murder.  After a nine year appeal process, 
the Missouri Supreme Court directly and unilaterally contradicted the Stanford decision, 
which, again, had sanctioned the executions of persons between the ages of 16 and 18, by 
striking down the state’s law allowing the death penalty for such individuals as a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.94
Unlike Medellin, which involved a treaty the U.S. had ratified, or the Guantánamo 
Bay prisoners’ cases, which involved the rights of foreign nationals held under wartime 
91 See Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On the Constitution of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 108th Congress (2004)(statement of 
Professor Vicki Jackson, Georgetown University Law School).
92 See Gerald L. Neuman, Agora: The United States Constitution And International Law – The Uses of 
International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT’L. LAW 82 (January 2004).
93
 For, example, the cases of Rasul v. Bush and Al-Odah v. United States, which concerned the question of 
whether United States courts could exercise jurisdiction over challenges to the legality of detaining foreign 
nationals, captured during the 2001-02 hostilities in Afghanistan, at the Guantánamo Bay U.S. Naval Base 
in Cuba, attracted such interest.  See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae 175 Members of Both Houses of the 
Parliament at 16-19, Rasul; Brief of Amici Curiae Commonwealth Lawyers Association, at 2, Rasul, 
available at http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload500/83/
amicuscuriae_%20commonwealth_lawyers_association.pdf (noting how the writ of habeas corpus
originated in England and how the Court had previously referred to these origins and “the harmony 
between the relevant laws of the two jurisdictions.”); Brief of Amici Curiae International Commission of 
Jurists et. al., at 7, Rasul, available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/rasul_v_bush/legal/petitioners/
International%20Commission%20of%20Jurists% 20Brief.pdf; Brief of Amici Curiae Human Rights 
Institute of the International Bar Association, at 8-10, Rasul, available at http://www.ccr-
ny.org/v2/rasul_v_bush/legal/petitioners/International%20Bar%20Association%20Brief.pdf. 
94
 Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003).
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conditions, Roper carried no implications beyond U.S. borders except in the realm of 
public opinion.  It was a case concerning the murder of an American national by another 
American national on American soil which was investigated by American authorities.  
The law under which the original defendant was convicted and sentenced to death 
concerned no treaty with a foreign country or international convention, nor any other 
facet of U.S. foreign relations.  Until this year, no foreign party had demonstrated any 
kind of interest in the case.  Roper was, in sum, a basic death penalty appeal that probably 
caught the Court’s attention simply because a state supreme court chose to disregard 
federal constitutional law and conclude that the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.
And yet, the case attracted the interest of European Union representatives95 and 
Nobel Peace Prize laureates96 among others, who each presented a very ambitious case in 
favor of why foreign law and international conventions should at least influence this 
purely domestic capital punishment matter.  The amicus briefs supporting this 
perspective, which also included submissions from former U.S. diplomats97 and human 
rights organizations,98 cited how the execution of persons under the age of 18 violated 
customary international law mainly because virtually every country in the world had 
abolished the practice.  In their view, the prohibition had obtained the status of jus 
cogens, a peremptory norm of international law that no nation could violate according to 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which defined procedures by which 
95
 Brief of Amici Curiae The European Union, Roper.
96
 Brief of Amici Curiae President James Earl Carter, Jr., Roper.
97
 Brief of Amici Curiae Former U.S. Diplomats, Roper.
98
 Brief of Amici Curiae Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales, Roper.
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nations could adopt, interpret, or invalidate treaties.  There existed, however, one basic 
problem with this conclusion – the United States had not ratified this agreement.99
Nevertheless, the briefs’ general line of reasoning in favor of banning juvenile 
executions on jus cogens grounds can be summarized as follows.  The Convention states 
that nations must abide by jus cogens norms.  Prohibiting the execution of juveniles 
constitutes such a norm because numerous treaties, declarations, and international 
conventions make the concept prevalent in the annals of international law.  Consistent 
with this guideline, the vast majority of nations have abolished capital punishment for 
juveniles.  Each of these pertinent treaties and pronouncements and the like remain non-
derogable and no contrary norm appears to have emerged.  Finally, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has considered the views of the world community to be relevant to Eighth 
Amendment issues, an additional reason to take this opportunity to abolish a practice that 
the vast majority of nations have rejected.100
Setting the issue of ratification aside, this argument still remains malleable on the 
first and last grounds.  In the first case, the treaties and conventions the briefs cite either 
contain no language explicitly requiring the United States to abolish the death penalty for 
juveniles in the context Roper presented or have no binding effect on the United States at 
all.101  And the final prong of the briefs’ case primarily involves citations to the more 
99
 In sum, the Convention outlined the “international law” governing treaties.  The Convention primarily 
codified already existing and binding customary law on treaties, and so aside from some necessary gap-
filling and clarification, it did not really change existing international law. This means that unlike most 
treaties, the Vienna Convention could arguably bind non-parties.
100 Supra note 105.
101
 The amicus brief submitted by the Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales and other 
human rights organizations offers what is probably the most extensive description, among all the amicus 
briefs against the imposition of capital punishment on juveniles, of arguably applicable international 
conventions.  The brief refers to treaties, United Nations resolutions, and rulings by the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights.  Brief of Amici Curiae Human Rights Committee, at 13-17, Roper.
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internationalist line of Supreme Court cases referring to non-U.S. legal principles 
discussed previously.  Again, these cases refer to these sources solely in an advisory 
context – the need for a particular law can be exemplified by the existence or absence of 
a similar law in another country.  The legal premise from which these decisions stem are 
strengthened by these references, but by no means dependent on them.  To refer to 
foreign legal authorities on a persuasive level is, consequently, purely optional.
The Court’s eventual decision followed the lead established in Lawrence – it did 
not give any non-U.S. law or international convention binding effect.  Yet the majority 
      The treaties cited include the 1966 International Convention on Civil and Public Rights (I.C.C.P.R.), 
which was intended to more specifically apply the seminal 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the 1989 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 1949 Geneva Convention Related to the 
Protection of Civilians in Times of War, and the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights.  Of these 
conventions, the I.C.C.P.R., which explicitly prohibits juvenile executions, also contains a reservation to 
U.S. ratification concerning the same issue, which other signatories have, of course, criticized, but which 
nevertheless makes the provision’s applicability questionable.  U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and 
Understandings, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Reservation I(2), 138 Cong. Rec. 
S4781-01 (Apr. 2, 1992), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty5_asp.htm.  The U.S. has 
not ratified the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child.  Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened 
for signature Nov. 20, 1989, art. 37, 1577 U.N.T.S. 43, 28 I.L.M. 1448; see also U.N.I.C.E.F., Convention 
on the Rights of the Child - Introduction, available at http://www.unicef.org/crc/crc.htm (describes 
ratification status).  In contrast, the United States has ratified the Geneva Convention, which precludes the 
execution of “those who...find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the 
conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals” and who are under eighteen years of age.  
Yet this convention, specifically intended for times of war, does not encompass the situation of a basic 
murder at peacetime Roper concerns.  Geneva Convention Related to the Protection of Civilians in Times 
of War, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, art. 5, 68, U.N.T.S. No. 973, vol. 75.  Finally, the American Convention, 
which also prohibits juvenile executions, has also not been ratified by the United States.  American 
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 4, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
      The brief also cites several United Nations resolutions opposing the practice of executing juveniles, 
mainly consisting of resolutions from the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.  However, United 
Nations resolutions are not legally binding upon the United States, or any member nation for that matter, in 
and of themselves.  See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER, art. 10.
      Finally, the brief notes how the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (I.A.H.C.R.), a body of 
the Organization of American States, found that a jus cogens norm precludes juvenile executions in a 
number of rulings.  See, e.g., Michael Domingues v. United States, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 62/02, Merits Case 
12.285 (2002).  Again, however, I.A.C.H.R. findings are not binding upon member states.  Organization of 
American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, available at http://www.cidh.oas.org.
       For a detailed analysis of how international law applies to the U.S. death penalty in general, see 
Laurence E. Rothenberg, International Law, U.S. Sovereignty, and the Death Penalty, 35 GEO. J. INT’L. L. 
547 (2004).  This article argues that international law in general does not prohibit the imposition of the 
death penalty and refers to most of the conventions and treaties cited previously by documenting how they 
do not bind the United States.
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opinion’s language certainly legitimized the idea of letting such resources exercise an 
unprecedented level of influence over the decisionmaking process.
The need to abolish the death penalty for juvenile murderers, Justice Kennedy 
noted, found “confirmation in the stark reality that the United States [was] the only 
country in the world that continue[d] to give official sanction” to such punishment.102
Those opposing such comparative perspectives on the death penalty, or similarly 
controversial domestic social issues, could have found a small degree of comfort in his 
admission that “this reality [was not] controlling, for the task of interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment remain[ed] [the Court’s] responsibility.”103   Yet the opinion certainly left 
open the possibility for more such “non-binding” influences.
Despite the fact that the United States had not ratified the U.N. Convention on the 
Rights of the Child prohibiting capital punishment for juveniles, Justice Kennedy referred 
to this treaty as if it constituted international law binding upon the United States given 
how every country in the world except Somalia had recognized it.  And in so doing, he 
acknowledged the arguments to that effect the amicus briefs from the European Union 
and others presented.104
In terms of referring to specific foreign practices, however, the Court limited itself 
to discussing the history of capital punishment for juveniles and its abolition in Great 
Britain, the country with which the United States perhaps bore the greatest number of 
similarities “in light of the historic ties between” the two nations.105  Justice Kennedy 
concluded by stating: “It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its 
102
 Roper, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 2200 at *43.
103 Id. at *44.
104 Id. at *45-46.
105 Id. at *47.
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origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other 
nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our 
own heritage of freedom.”106
Perhaps Roper, then, was meant to signal a subtle change in the internationalist 
approach.  Instead of looking to see how foreign courts and the like examined a given 
issue at a dispute’s outset, simply checking the extent to which other countries had 
reached the same conclusion after reaching a decision would constitute a more viable 
course of action.  But this change certainly did not take place in practice.  The Court still 
cited to conventions the United States had not approved and gave non-U.S. legal 
principles more than a passing reference.
The Court’s failure to actually bind the United States to any non-domestic law 
certainly did not calm the internationalist trend’s congressional critics, who still seemed 
to fear that the Court could eventually follow such a course.  Shortly after the decision, 
Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) introduced a measure similar to the Feeney-Goodblatte 
Resolution in the Senate.  In cautious support of Cornyn, Senator Lindsey Graham (R-
S.C.) stated: “I don’t believe it’s the role of the court to determine how the United States 
fits into the world.”107  The debate over the Court’s approach, then, certainly promises to 
cause more debate beyond the legal academy and the judiciary in Congress and the 
media.
For one who supports the outcomes of such cases as Lawrence and Roper, 
American courts’ use of foreign law and international conventions in evaluating domestic 
constitutional disputes may indeed constitute a welcome development.  Yet the very idea 
106 Id. at *49.
107
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that an American court may refer to a foreign practice in justifying any approach to a 
domestic legal issue actually merits a great deal of concern on the part of all sides of the 
legal and political spectrum.  
III) THE CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL INTERNATIONALISM
The basic problem underlying the internationalist approach the Court followed in 
Lawrence and Roper is simply that no set of “neutral, generally accepted legal 
principles”108 exists to guide the use of foreign legal authorities in anything other than the 
two instances the first two lines of cases previously discussed respectively reflect.  The 
Court’s internationalist decisions simply refer to some foreign law or non-binding 
international convention that agrees with a specific ruling, without clarifying why the 
specific references used merit definitive weight.  Why, for example, does one brief from 
the European Union demonstrate a growing international consensus against the execution 
of the mentally retarded as Lawrence claimed?  It is possible that the Court may have set 
a precedent for judges in need of support for debatable rulings to simply pick whatever 
non-U.S. authority suits their preferences, thereby adding a new level of subjectivity to 
judicial decisionmaking.  
Specifically, there are five reasons why the use of non-U.S. legal authorities in 
constitutional interpretation remains unwise.  First, the Framers never intended for courts 
to have the power to refer to non-U.S. legal materials as binding or influential authority 
when sufficient guidance concerning a pertinent issue existed in American law.  Second, 
the lack of any constitutional framework to support an internationalist approach threatens 
to make the use of non-American legal authorities inconsistent and arbitrary.  Third, on a 
108 See Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On the Constitution of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 108th Congress 8 (2004)(statement 
of Professor Michael Ramsey, University of San Diego Law School).
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more philosophical or theoretical level, because all nations indeed differ from each other 
in the social and cultural contexts that result in laws’ development, a foreign state’s 
practice concerning an issue can never really be relevant or be “transferred” to the United 
States.  This is especially the case if the authority charged with applying developments to 
the U.S. is an unelected judge whose true area of expertise is U.S. law and who lacks 
access to adequate resources for research on foreign law and culture.  
The fourth reason against an internationalist approach to judicial decisionmaking 
involves the danger of becoming too concerned with international public opinion on 
specific American practices.  Simply put, if the arguments the Roper amicus diplomats’ 
briefs advanced – that American courts should consider how foreign laws would 
approach a domestic issue for the sake of international approval – becomes enshrined in 
law in one instance, it is possible that future judges will have license to do the same in 
other circumstances and in a manner that may more clearly conflict with established, and 
otherwise more definitely constitutional, American legal practice.  In terms of the fifth 
and final argument against judicial internationalism, the fact that unelected judges will be 
the ones doing so can only weaken the judiciary’s legitimacy in the eyes of the American 
population, since that very legitimacy depends on “making legally principled decisions 
under circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be 
accepted by the Nation.”109
A) Reference To Non-U.S. Legal Authorities Violates The Framers’ Original Intent
Why is the Framers’ intent on a given constitutional issue, if they expressed any, 
important?  That is, why should a judge apply the Constitution according to the principles 
intended by those who prepared the document?  Space constraints obviously preclude an 
109
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extensive defense of the originalist theory of constitutional interpretation here.  Yet the 
concept of originalism merits some explanation because the idea that the courts should 
not use foreign laws and international conventions as persuasive or binding authorities in 
anything but cases involving foreign interests or international law is fundamentally 
originalist in nature.
When testifying in favor of the Feeney-Goodblatte Resolution, Professor John 
McGinnis of the Northwestern University Law School discussed how the judiciary’s 
“institutional competence” depended on adherence to the Constitution’s original 
meaning.  He claimed:
[The argument for originalism] parallels the argument for democracy itself.  Originalism is the 
worst system of interpretation except for all the others.  While sometimes it is difficult to discern 
the original meaning of the constitution because of the passage of time, at least the inquiry into 
historical meaning requires judges to enage in disciplined search for objective evidence and to 
consider the purposes of others rather than their own.  As such, originalism constitutes a break on 
judicial willfulness and subjectivity – tendencies that deprive the judiciary of the comparative 
advantage they hold over other political actors in constitutional interpretation and therefore 
undermine the justification for the judiciary’s power to invalidate statutes through judicial 
review…[I]f we abandon this common default rule of interpretation, there are scores of current 
interpretative theories from which to choose and many others that surely will be advanced by 
scholars yet unborn…If our Constitution is a common bond, we need a common way of 
understanding it and that common understanding can only be provided by the default rule of 
interpretation that we generally apply to historical documents.110
What the Constitution and writings by the Founding Fathers have to say about using 
foreign law in constitutional interpretation is, therefore, crucial to guiding courts towards 
utilizing that law appropriately, if they can even utilize it legitimately at all.
The Declaration of Independence first set forth the Framers’ intent with regard to 
how American policymakers and judges should allow foreign legal perspectives to 
influence the development of American law.  The Declaration’s first paragraph argued 
that when a region chooses to declare independence from a controlling authority, “a 
110 Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On the Constitution of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 108th Congress 3-4 (2004)(statement 
of Professor John McGinnis, Northwestern University Law School).
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decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes 
which impel them to separation.”111  The Founding Fathers wanted other nations to view 
the region encompassing Britain’s thirteen original North American colonies as an 
independent state that no longer had to answer to the dictates of King George III of 
England.  In other words, they wanted other states to view what would become the 
United States of America as an equal in the community of nations that was “not subject to 
the control of influence of another” and that enjoyed the “freedom to manage all of its 
affairs, whether external or internal, without control by other countries.”112  And to come 
closer to attaining this objective, they at least had to set forth the reasons that drove their 
declaration of independence from England.
Respecting foreign opinion, then, did not necessarily mean deferring to that 
opinion.  The “respect” to which the Declaration referred meant explaining the reasons 
for declaring independence from England in the hope that others would understand the 
American cause’s rightfulness.  After all, the leaders of any land seeking independence 
from a colonizer would probably want other nations to accept its legitimacy as an 
independent state, at least as a way of pressuring the colonizers to grant their wishes for 
self-determination.  But in the end, the fact that this attempt to engage world opinion was 
a document that helped continue a revolution signified that American sovereignty, and 
the idea that Americans would have the ultimate say on the laws that would govern them, 
came first.  Foreign support for domestic actions in American interests, then, would not 
be dispositive.
111 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
112 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 774 (7th ed. 1999)(defining “independence”).
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The Federalist Papers later reflected this same perspective.  In Federalist Number
63, Alexander Hamilton or James Madison stated:
An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two 
reasons: the one is, that, independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it 
is desirable, on various accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of 
a wise and honorable policy; the second is, that in doubtful cases, particularly where the 
national councils may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the 
presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be 
followed. What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign nations; and 
how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and propriety of 
her measures had, in every instance, been previously tried by the light in which they 
would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind? 113
In a very basic word, this statement, along with the first paragraph of the Declaration of 
Independence, highlighted the importance of keeping an open mind.  Sometimes, foreign 
perspectives could teach America how to frame its laws in a way that more effectively 
attained the goals its founding principles outlined, as the fact that the U.S. Bill of Rights 
derived a number of its provisions from the English Bill of Rights of 1689 demonstrated.
Yet only America could decide upon the course of action that lay in its best 
interests after evaluating all possible perspectives.  Consequently, in Federalist Number 
14, Madison claimed:
Is it not the glory of the people of America, that, whilst they have paid a decent regard to 
the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration 
for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good 
sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience? To 
this manly spirit, posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the world for the 
example, of the numerous innovations displayed on the American theatre, in favor of 
private rights and public happiness.114
Examining foreign perspectives for enlightenment, without compromising American 
principles of law, then, became a staple of American jurisprudence involving 
international law.  The earliest lawmakers acknowledged the need to abide by 
international law, with the Constitution granting Congress the power “to define and 
113 THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison)(which of these two authored the 
article remains the subject of debate among historians.).
114 THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison).
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punish…offences against the Law of Nations.”115  But the same Constitution did not 
allow unlimited authority to set American legal principles aside.  Article VI stated:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance 
thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound 
thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary 
notwithstanding.116
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution made the Framers’ intent with regard to using 
foreign law to support constitutional interpretation of issues with solely domestic 
implications clear – the Constitution of the United States and the principles it enshrined 
in American law were to serve as the ultimate guide for courts in the decisions they 
made.  In the bulk of the Court’s decisions before Trop that referred to foreign or 
international law, then, references to non-U.S. legal authorities took place only to the 
extent that they were consistent with a tenet of American law in some way or where the 
issues a case presented mandated a reference to them.  
B) Reference To Non-U.S. Legal Authorities Can Never Be Consistent
Originalism, however, is certainly not the only theory of constitutional 
interpretation to which judges adhere.  Although he is one of the most prominent, if not 
the single most prominent, originalist legal scholars today, Robert Bork proposed seven 
reasons why originalism might make one uncomfortable: 
• Original understanding is unknowable
• The belief that the Constitution must change as society changes 
• The claim that “there is no real reason the living should be governed by 
the dead” 
115
 U.S. CONST. art. I.
116
 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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• The view that there is no basis for continuing loyalty to the Constitution 
as law
• The idea that constitutional interpretation is by nature a subjective process 
that makes the Constitution essentially into what judges say it is
• The belief that originalism’s claim to political neutrality is a “pretense 
since the choice of that philosophy is itself a political decision” 
• What Bork calls “the impossibility of clause-bound interpretivism,” or the 
claim that the “law of the Constitution commands judges to find rights 
that are not specified in the Constitution.”117
In the spirit of these criticisms, and especially in the spirit of the second one, perhaps 
Chief Justice Warren’s conception of the Eighth Amendment as expressed in Trop best 
highlights a more pragmatic perspective antithetical to originalism: the Constitution must 
“draw its meaning from the evolving standards…that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”118  Can foreign laws concerning a particular issue, then, effectively measure 
such progress?
Using foreign or international law in constitutional interpretation affecting purely 
domestic issues should even concern someone who advocates this more flexible approach 
to adjudication.  There exists no framework for what sorts of foreign sources or what 
country’s perspectives a court should consider when it wishes to utilize such tools in 
evaluating such matters.  If courts are to adopt the practice of referring to foreign legal 
principles and treaties in interpreting the Constitution and resolving disputes in all types 
of domestic cases, then, the general absence of any sort of guideline as to how to 
implement such an approach, in statutory or case law, allows judges to mold their own 
personal views into law. 
117 See ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 161-185 
(The Free Press 1990). 
118
 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
46
The implications of this situation are simple, as two hypothetical scenarios will 
illustrate.  Because an exhaustive reference to what every country’s laws have to say on a 
subject is probably impractical, the temptation for a judge to use foreign materials 
selectively in order to support a specific outcome will be too great.  One should note that 
as flexible or pragmatic or as liberal as one may view the non-originalist approach Trop
exemplified, the decision still referred to the Eighth Amendment as a sort of 
philosophical base.  Its meaning may have evolved, but the basic textual guidelines were 
still applicable.  In contrast, there exists no such “base” principle from which to 
determine what foreign laws to use in constitutional interpretation.  The Court’s 
internationalist decisions illustrate no distinct method by which to utilize such sources.  
This lack of guidance simply allows too much of an opportunity for the judge who wishes 
to pick and choose precedents according to the particular outcome he desires, instead of 
applying the “neutral, generally accepted set of legal principles” that the Court has itself 
acknowledged is crucial to its legitimacy.  A case’s results will consequently not depend 
on such principles, but on a judge’s own personal preferences as to policy and the like.  
And any result will likely be possible because of foreign legal literature’s vastness – a 
simple situation of basically finding the right sources so that the message that a judge 
wants to send is sent.
i) The Internationalist Approach Could Have Caused A Different Result In 
Lawrence
If the Court indeed assumed a purely outcome-determinative approach in its 
internationalist decisions, one should have great cause for concern for this very reason. 
Consider how in Lawrence, then, the Court only referred to two European sources to 
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support its contention that an emerging world consensus in favor of homosexual rights 
justified its decision.  
But why only refer to Europe?  The United States might share common cultural 
traits with Europe and, in England’s instance, a common legal system.  Yet does not the 
growing number of Americans who trace their ancestry to non-European nations make 
the experience of such nations relevant as well?119  Perhaps the fact that the British 
colonial legacy in countries of the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia led to the development of 
similar common law judicial systems could ameliorate any concerns that one might have 
about referring to laws from such states with cultural traditions that differ extensively 
from American ones.  Why not examine what those countries’ laws have to say about 
homosexual sodomy?120
In fact, as Professor Roger Alford of the Pepperdine University School of Law 
has noted, had the Court engaged in a more inclusive overview of global perspectives on 
this issue, it may well not have been able to refer to the emergence of a definitive global 
consensus in favor of homosexuals’ rights to privacy at all.121  Simply put, 84 out of the 
195 sovereign states in the world still have enforceable laws barring sexual intercourse 
between two consenting adults of the same gender.122
119
 For example, one estimate places the share of “nonwhites” as a percentage of the U.S. population at 
22.9%.  This figure includes individuals of African and Asian descent, as well as members of other ethnic 
groups as well.  See Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Factbook – United States, available at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html#People. 
120 See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Use of International Law in Judicial Decisions, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 423, 428 (limiting references to European sources constitutes a form of “Eurocentrism” when 
American citizens come from “all corners of the globe.”).
121
 Roger P. Alford, Agora: The United States Constitution And International Law – Misusing International 
Sources To Interpret The Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L. LAW 57, 66 (2004).
122Id; see also International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, Where Having Sex is a Crime: 
Criminalization and Decriminalization of Homosexual Acts (2003), available at
http://www.iglhrc.org/site/iglhrc/content.php?type=1&id=77.
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What the Court implied in Lawrence, therefore, was that the European Union was 
somehow the best model for the United States in examining foreign perspectives on 
homosexual conduct.  Yet the Court really did not say why.  And even if it had set forth 
such a reason, the possibility for debate still would have existed in that the Court would 
have opened the door to a string of cases concerning the criteria by which to select 
foreign legal sources.  If the Court, then, was trying to legitimize the idea that because 
other countries had legalized homosexual activity, the United States should do so as well, 
its selectivity in selecting states to serve as a model certainly remains obvious given the 
true state of the ability to legally engage in homosexual activity throughout the world.  
Had the Court referred to other countries and not the European Union, or even performed 
an exhaustive study of all 195 countries in the world, it most definitely could not have 
claimed that the United States should follow the lead of the “rest of the world” in 
promoting homosexual rights because the “rest of the world” really did not promote such 
rights or had not developed a consensus on the issue.
Criticizing the Court’s apparent “Eurocentrism”123 has absolutely nothing to do 
with whether one agrees that the Constitution bans states from forbidding homosexual 
conduct or not.  In fact, in a more roundabout or theoretical sense, the Court may have 
made overturning Lawrence easier for its successors.  The Court referred to how Bowers
wrongly concluded that bans on homosexuality were consistent with the norms of 
Western civilization by citing the E.C.H.R. decision and Britain’s legalization of 
homosexuality.  What if the Court’s makeup should change in the next few years to 
include a majority of justices who personally find homosexuality to be morally 
abhorrent?  Just as the Court selectively referred to states that had legalized 
123See supra 120.
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homosexuality, a future Court could redo the analysis, adjust its criteria, and come to the 
opposite conclusion.  This scenario may not be likely in the near future.  But because the 
Court has offered no guidelines as to how to use foreign law in cases not involving 
international law or external interests, it remains a possibility.  At least, the Court would 
be able to go back on its claims of a definitive world consensus in favor of legalizing 
homosexual activity, for its analysis would depend upon what the Court viewed as proof 
of any such consensus.   
The reference to foreign law in Lawrence, Roper, and their internationalist 
predecessors may not have provided crucial support to the basic legal analyses that 
brought about their respective outcomes.  But because the Court has established the idea 
that the United States should approach a legal issue in a certain way because other states 
have done so in precedent, there consequently exists the prospect that this line of 
reasoning could definitively affect a future case’s outcome when two equally convincing 
domestic legal perspectives exist.  The issue of abortion rights may exemplify such an 
instance.
ii) The Internationalist Approach Could Have Reversed Roe v. Wade
Assume entirely for the sake of argument that the Court once again faces the same 
issue it faced in the seminal case of Roe v. Wade – whether the scope of the concept of 
personal liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
guarantees a woman’s right to abort a pregnancy in the first trimester of pregnancy.  The 
Court could have faced this same matter again given how Norma McCorvey, the original 
“Jane Roe” who has become a prominent pro-life activist, filed a Rule 60 motion124 to 
124
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 allows the original litigants in a court case to petition the court to 
change its ruling if relevant new evidence becomes available.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 60.
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overturn the initial ruling about two years ago.125  A Houston federal district court 
dismissed the motion last year and held that Roe “was certainly final in this litigation” 
and that it was “simply too late now, thirty years after the fact, for McCorvey to revisit 
that judgment.”126 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to hear oral arguments in 
the case on February 23, 2004 and considered the appeal based on McCorvey’s brief 
alone, a document that included more than 1,000 pages of affidavits by women who 
claimed that their abortions had emotionally harmed them in a manner that the original 
ruling did not consider possible.127  On September 14, 2004, the court dismissed the 
appeal – because the statutes declared unconstitutional in Roe had been repealed, 
McCorvey’s motion was moot.  The Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari.128
But how could the Court have reviewed this decision had it chosen to disregard 
the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion on the mootness issue?  Setting aside the issue of whether 
McCorvey filed her motion in a “reasonable time,” the case stemmed from two very 
convincing, yet diametrically opposite, perspectives.  On one end, in addition to repeating 
the original legal reasoning underlying Roe, the Court could have simply defended the 
decision on stare decisis grounds129 since so much of its reproductive rights jurisprudence 
over the past thirty-two years has simply stemmed from the assumption that the 
Constitution protects first trimester abortion rights.130
125
 McCorvey v. Hill, Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-1340-N, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12986, at *1 (N.D. Tex. 
June 19, 2003).  
126 Id. at *13.
127
 Allan Turner, 30 Years Later, ‘Jane Roe’ Takes Her Case Back To Court, HOUSTON CHRON., February 
20, 2004, at 1.
128
 McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73 U.S.L.W. 3495 (U.S. Feb. 22, 
2005)(No. 04-967).  
129 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999).
130 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 833 (the husband notification provision of the Pennsylvania 
Abortion Control Act placed an undue burden on a woman's right to have an abortion in a large fraction of 
cases and was unconstitutional); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989)(upholding 
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But the Court might also have followed the same line of reasoning it applied in 
Lawrence to outline the case for overturning Roe.  In the Lawrence opinion, the Court 
held that stare decisis did not constitute an “inexorable command,” but a “principle of 
policy” that did not mandate the use of a “mechanical formula of adherence to the latest 
decision.”131  So the discovery of compelling reasons to overrule a precedent certainly 
justified doing so, namely in the form of concluding that “world opinion” helped show 
how bans on sodomy “demean[ed]” the lives of homosexual persons.  Perhaps thirty-two 
years of new evidence, then, could have highlighted how abortion emotionally harmed 
women.
How could the Court have used foreign legal perspectives to choose either side of 
the question of whether it should overrule Roe?  In Lawrence, the Court cited the 
E.C.H.R. opinion to show that a growing international consensus against bans on 
homosexual sodomy had developed and that this overwhelming world opinion on the 
subject helped demonstrate that such laws demeaned the lives of homosexual persons, 
thereby providing a compelling interest to overturn Bowers.  Likewise, the Court could 
have referred to how the fact that 141 out of the world’s 195 independent countries still 
outlaw abortion on demand strengthens the contention that abortion harms women.  After 
all, 141 countries out of 195 certainly would have illustrated a broad international 
consensus in favor of outlawing abortion.132  In contrast, the Court could have simply 
referred to how most countries in Western Europe have legalized abortion in order to 
claim that the evidence McCorvey presented was not convincing enough on account of 
Roe v. Wade, but otherwise allowing states to prohibit the use of public funds and facilities to provide 
abortions).
131
 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
132
 Center for Reproductive Rights, The World’s Abortion Laws (September2003), available at 
http://www.crlp.org/pub_fac_abortion_laws.html.
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how “developed” countries, or countries with whom the U.S. shares a common cultural 
heritage, have come to favor abortion rights.133
Each of the results pertaining to the Roe scenario is completely opposed to the 
other.  And yet, had the Court reviewed the case, either one will be possible given the 
subjective nature of the reasoning the Court could pursue in deciding that foreign legal 
sources bear relevance to the issue at hand.  
The Court has no rule or writing by the Founding Fathers to document what 
sources to utilize and how extensively to utilize them.  This lack of guidance, deliberate 
or not, basically gives the Court license to assume whatever perspective it pleases without
saying why.  And the fact that two completely different outcomes could have result, 
thereby blatantly sidelining an opposite side that nevertheless stemmed from a strong 
constitutional perspective, should make both sides of the abortion controversy wonder
whether foreign legal sources should even be used at all, given how reconsidering Roe at 
all would only concern abortions in the United States.
The use of foreign legal sources in cases with no foreign implications can, 
therefore, never be consistent.  And because of the lack of neutral legal guidance on this 
issue, how else may judges refer to foreign legal sources but on the basis of some 
principle that satisfied a subjective whim of whatever political or legal philosophy they 
prefer?  Lawrence, Roper, and the rest of the internationalist decisions, then, carved new 
and unprecedented ground in creating a Pandora’s box of confusing questions.  A court 
can use foreign legal sources to aid in the process of constitutional interpretation, but a 
rhyme or reason to the sources it does use need not exist.  This situation simply allows 
too much of an opportunity for all judges, Republican or Democrat, conservative or 
133 Id.
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liberal, and originalist or pragmatic, to abuse their discretion under a very nebulous 
guideline that allows the use of foreign legal sources without further specifications.
C) Non-U.S. Legal Authorities Can Never Be Truly Relevant To Purely Domestic 
Issues
In reality, the likelihood that an American judge will refer to the laws of 
developing countries in Asia or Africa as an appropriate model for a decision probably 
remains slim.  What has likely driven the Eurocentrism evident in most and 
internationalist decisions is the fundamental truth that the United States has historically 
shared more in common culturally with the nations of western Europe than with any other 
region of the world.  Even today, as the rate of non-European descendants as a share of 
the American population decreases, the vast majority of natural-born Americans can still 
trace their ancestry to the nations of Europe.  With that ancestry comes such shared 
cultural traits as the relation of the English language to Europe’s many Anglo-Saxon 
languages or adherence to the Christian faith.  If American courts restrict their non-U.S. 
legal references to laws and court decisions from these countries, where they may have 
arisen from similar cultural contexts, then, is judicial internationalism really a trend to 
fear?  
In fact, a nation’s laws stem from its own unique social, historical, and political 
background.  Consequently, no foreign law can ever be completely “transferable” to 
another country, even if the same country’s courts refer to that law as persuasive rather 
than binding authority.  To hold that a law’s presence or absence in a peer nation is a 
relevant, if not central, reason why a state should or should not enact a similar law simply 
ignores the contextual milieu of each country’s social, cultural, and historical 
background.
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Judge Posner has articulated this same perspective and has suggested that the very 
subtlety of the factors from which laws often result place such an understanding beyond 
most American jurists’ competence.  He has claimed:
The…problem with citing foreign decisions in U.S. courts is that they emerge from a 
complex socio-historico-politico-institutional background of which our judges, I 
respectfully suggest, are almost entirely ignorant.  (Do any of the Supreme Court justices 
know any foreign languages well enough to read a judicial decision that is not written in 
English?  And are translations of foreign decisions into English reliable?)...To cite 
foreign law as authority is to flirt with the discredited (I thought) idea of a universal 
natural law; or to suppose fantastically that the world’s judges constitute a single, elite 
community of wisdom and conscience.134
Judge Posner’s argument applies to any kind of reference to non-American law in 
considering purely domestic issues, from the aggressive approach some of the Roper 
amicus briefs advocated to the more innocuous approach evidenced in Lawrence and 
Roper itself.  
The concept that a state and its laws, and the particular society or culture they 
encompass, are unique and non-transferable is not a new one.  In The Republic, where he 
defined the notion of a “state,” Plato himself argued that societies were invariably formed 
for a particular purpose and that individuals gathered into communities for the mutual 
attainment of common aims, facilitated by laws and governments.135  So what one might 
call the English experience or the German experience on a particular issue can never be 
entirely relevant to the American experience on the same issue because each might stem 
from different factors with which an American judge, well-versed only in American law, 
may well not be familiar simply because she has grown up in a different country and 
culture.
134 Supra note 89.
135 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 53 (Barnes & Noble 2004)(“A State…arises…out of the needs of mankind; no 
one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants…Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are 
needed to supply them, one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another; and when these partners 
and helpers are gathered together in one habitation the body of inhabitants is termed a State.”).
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Judge Posner’s example of the death penalty may best exemplify this situation.  It 
is fair to say that pressuring the United States to abolish capital punishment has become a 
favored cause in European legal and diplomatic circles, if the European Union’s filing of 
numerous amicus briefs in Supreme Court death penalty cases is any guide.  An 
American judge, then, may indeed feel that the imposition of capital punishment is 
unbecoming a western democracy and that the United States is unique in its stubborn 
retention of the ultimate sentence.
But could this uniqueness, in fact, not really stem from more negative factors on 
Europe’s part?  The death penalty may indeed be harsh.  And it is true that there is 
probably no greater travesty of justice than to execute a person who has committed no 
crime against another or against society.  So when one examines capital punishment’s 
history in both Europe and the United States, is it fair to say that their histories in regard 
to this issue are interchangeable?  Judge Posner states:
It seems highly likely that the European rejection of the death penalty, which advocates 
of abolition in the United States cite as evidence for an emerging international consensus 
that ought to influence our Supreme Court, is related to two things: the past overuse of 
the penalty by European nations (think only of the executions for petty larceny in 18th-
century England, the Reign of Terror in France, and the rampant employment of the death 
penalty by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union); and the less democratic cast of 
European politics, which makes elite opinion more likely to override public opinion there 
than in the United States.  For example, public opinion in the United Kingdom supports 
the death penalty as strongly as public opinion in the United States does, yet Parliament 
repealed the death penalty…in 1965 and has since steadily refused to reconsider.136
The death penalty’s retention by 38 U.S. states and the federal government, then, is not 
something of which one should be as ashamed from the perspective of the history of 
human rights in the States.  One may certainly oppose the death penalty on moral 
grounds.  But the history of its imposition in the United States is not marred by the sorts 
of horrific episodes Judge Posner cites.  Americans should feel ashamed of such events as 
136 Supra note 137.
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the Salem Witchcraft Trials or the cases of Sacco and Vanzetti and the Scottsboro Boys.  
But when this record is compared with that of western Europe, no matter how respectful 
of democracy and human rights its governments may be today, there is probably no 
credible comparison possible.  It may be simplistic, then, to say that Europeans are more 
skeptical of the death penalty because of their history and their experiences with it, but it 
appears to be true to a degree.  The average German can probably relate to the danger of 
the state executing an innocent person far better than the average American can because 
the latter, if one might generalize, is more familiar with the death penalty as a punishment 
for common murderers, individuals who arguably merit the punishment, that is imposed 
with such guarantees as due process and rights to appeal in place.
Hence, if a person claims that there is an international consensus against the death 
penalty, as evidenced by its absence in European legal systems, one must be careful to 
understand why such a “consensus” exists and why the same “consensus” may not be 
relevant to the United States at all.  The circumstances under which the United States has 
imposed capital punishment for the most part have differed significantly from those 
throughout European history.  The United States was founded upon such ideals as 
religious tolerance, which was not evident in Spain during the Inquisition, and the view 
that an accused criminal is considered innocent until proven guilty, which was 
completely absent in France’s Dreyfus affair and the persecution of political dissidents 
and non-preferred ethnic groups in Nazi Germany.  To say that the United States should 
abolish the death penalty in order to join the ranks of western democracies, then, may 
make sense if one opposes capital punishment in principle.  But if European practices 
form a central part of an abolitionist case – that Europe’s practice in and of itself is a 
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good reason to abolish the death penalty or the main reason to do so – then that same case 
will rest upon grounds that are not really applicable to the United States. 
  But what about Great Britain?  As Justice Kennedy implied in Roper, Great 
Britain is probably the foreign country with which the United States shares the most in 
common.  The United States, for example, shares a common language with Great Britain 
and a history in which Christianity has played a major role.  And most importantly, from 
a legal perspective, the United States legal system stems from Great Britain’s.  Both 
countries adhere to common law principles and maintain such traditions as trial by jury 
and habeas corpus.  And the 1791 Bill of Rights is partially modeled on the British Bill 
of Rights of 1689.  If courts cannot utilize an internationalist legal perspective because of 
cultural differences, could they not make an exception for Great Britain?
In fact, even Great Britain has its own historical idiosyncrasies that might make 
its legal authorities more irrelevant to the United States than an internationalist jurist 
might wish to admit.  As Judge Posner noted in the earlier quote, perhaps Parliament’s 
1965 abolition of the death penalty in spite of popular opinion might stem from Great 
Britain’s monarchical past and once rigid class system.  After all, the very concept of a 
hereditary monarchy rests upon such principles as divine right and the idea that some 
individuals, through no real doing of their own, are more fit to govern and hold certain 
positions.  Perhaps some Britons still unconsciously held this view, thereby making 
Parliament’s actions more tolerable for them.  In contrast, the United States has no such 
political tradition or social more, a fact that is perhaps reflected in both the Republican 
and Democratic parties’ official support of capital punishment and many governors’ 
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reluctance to halt executions, a remarkable consistency with American public opinion on 
the subject.
Referring to British law in some contexts may even disregard perspectives 
American case law mandates.  For example, a much debated provision of the U.S. No 
Child Left Behind Act, which enacts a number of education system reforms,137 sanctions 
government aid to faith-based educational initiatives.138  Does this facet of the Act not 
violate the Constitution’s Establishment Clause?139  And does such a provision 
appropriately concern individuals who fear that government may be sending a tacit 
message of approval in favor of the particular religious faith to which the initiative’s 
organization might belong?
American judicial precedent holds that government may not advance any 
religion.140  But if one were to take the position that the Establishment Clause only 
precluded the establishment of a state church and not government support of social 
programs with secular aims that religious organizations happen to run,141 this type of 
initiative would likely be constitutionally defensible if it could be proven that it would 
137
 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C.A. § 7231 et. seq. (2004)(among other regulations, 
requiring states to implement achievement standards in reading and mathematics and voucher programs, 
while allowing states greater flexibility in the use of federal education funds and increasing federal funding 
for elementary school reading instruction initiatives). 
138 Id.
139 See Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of Univ. Of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995)(citations 
omitted)(“We have recognized special Establishment Clause dangers where the government makes direct 
money payments to sectarian institutions.”).
140
 According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, in order to determine whether a 
government measure has the effect of “establishing” religion, a court must consider whether the measure 
has a religious purpose, advances or inhibits religion, and excessively entangles the government in religious 
affairs.  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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 Adherents to the “originalist” school of thought often adhere to this view.  See, e.g. Elk Grove Unified 
School District v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct 2301, 2330 (2004)(Thomas, J., dissenting)(“The Establishment 
Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” As a textual 
matter, this Clause probably prohibits Congress from establishing a national religion (citation omitted). 
Perhaps more importantly, the Clause made clear that Congress could not interfere with state 
establishments, notwithstanding any argument that could be made based on Congress' power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause (citation omitted).  Nothing in the text of the Clause suggests that it reaches 
any further.”).
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not convey a message of sanctioning a particular religious view to an impressionable 
minor.  
Here, however, is where reference to British authorities, with which American 
law admittedly does have a lot in common, might become problematic.  To prove that 
students would not somehow feel indoctrinated, an advocate of a faith-based educational 
initiative could prove, by performing a statistical study or the like, that exposure to the 
program would not somehow increase the level of religious observance or the level of 
adherence to the initiative’s specific faith among the targeted student group.  In this case, 
one could analogize the situation to that of the British educational system and the laws to 
which it answers.  The British Education Reform Act of 1988 requires state schools to 
offer a daily act of collective worship “of a broadly Christian character,” given the 
existence of a state church adhering to the Anglican faith tradition.142  In addition, 
religious education must follow a Christian orientation.143  This is a far more aggressive 
advancement of a religious idea than anything the No Child Left Behind Act explicitly  
sanctions.  
And yet in showing that the American law would not advance religion by analogy 
to the British experience, one could cite the generally low rates of attendance at Church 
of England services in Great Britain, especially among younger people, when compared 
against British population figures as a whole.144  In other words, those who fear that 
142
 Education Reform Act 1988, § 6-7.
143 Id., § 8.
144
 The Central Intelligence Agency has estimated Great Britain’s population to be 60,270,708.  Of that 
figure, approximately 41,560,000 belong to a Christian denomination by baptism, with the Anglican and 
Roman Catholic faiths encompassing all but 1,560,000 of these individuals.  Central Intelligence Agency, 
C.I.A. World Factbook – United Kingdom, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/
uk.html.  And yet, the rate of religious observance among this Christian population remains quite low.  As 
the state church in England, the Church of England by far holds the largest baptized membership of all 
Christian denominations in the United Kingdom.  But the decline in attendance of Church of England 
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exposure to an educational initiative with a secular aim, which is run by a religious 
organization, need not fear that students will resultingly prefer the faith to which the 
same organization adheres, since more aggressive attempts to advance religion have been 
tried in Great Britain, a country that adheres to similar concepts of religious tolerance, to 
absolutely no avail.
But would the British experience automatically recreate itself in the States?  
Might British statistics on church attendance not instead reflect a deep-seated popular 
cynicism towards organized religion in general that the well-documented excesses of 
many European church denominations as late as the middle, and even late, twentieth 
century may have molded?  The history of organized religion in Europe is fraught with 
such instances as prelates sanctioning the rule of dictators or other state practices that 
could easily be considered immoral.145  A Briton might resent what he views as his 
country’s history of unwarranted discrimination against Roman Catholics, as evidenced 
worship services, and services in other denominations, has been noted by the media for quite some time.  
See, e.g.,  UK Is “Losing” Its Religion, BBC NEWS, NOV. 28, 2000, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1043986.stm.  In fact, as of 2002, the last year for which figures are 
available, the Church of England registered a membership of only 1,166,000 on its parishes’ electoral rolls, 
with an average weekly attendance of 937,000 adults and 228,000 children.  Church of England, Church 
Statistics 2002, at 14, 15, available at http://www.cofe.anglican.org/info/statistics/churchstatistics2002. 
145
 Among the most obvious and famous such episodes are the Spanish Inquisition and the persecution of 
Roman Catholics (e.g. seizure of churches and cathedrals) that followed the split, at the direction of King 
Henry VIII, of the British Catholic Church from the Roman Catholic Church, thereby creating the modern 
Church of England, in 1534.  And Martin Luther, the founder of the Lutheran faith encompassing much of 
the German population and the majorities of the populations of the Scandinavian countries, called for the 
destruction of Jewish homes and synagogues in Germany, an episode which many believe gave the 
denomination a legacy of tolerating anti-Semitism that lasted until the Nazi era.  More recently, the Roman 
Catholic Church has been accused of not having done enough, through its vast influence in axis Italy to 
prevent the Holocaust.  For a particularly controversial explanation of this accusation, see John Cornwell, 
HITLER’S POPE: THE SECRET HISTORY OF PIUS XII (Penguin-Putnam 1999).  Regardless of whether these 
latter accusations are true (and they remain the subject of much debate and research supporting both sides 
of the charges), much of the Spanish Catholic hierarchy openly supported the rule of General Francisco 
Franco, a Fascist and known Nazi sympathizer who ruled Spain from 1939 to 1975, until the advent of the 
Second Vatican Council of 1962-65.  See, e.g., Paul Preston, FRANCO 213-14, 717-20 (Fontana Press 1993).
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by the existence of a state church adhering to the Anglican faith146 and such resulting 
laws as the prohibition on an heir or heiress to the throne marrying a Roman Catholic.147
More recently, the once bloody conflict in Northern Ireland, where sides divided 
themselves along Catholic and Protestant lines, may have led people to wonder whether 
strong religious allegiances might fuel unhealthy emotions towards those of other faiths 
(to say the least).
The point here is that history often shapes popular attitudes at a specific moment 
in time.  And Great Britain, with its longer history, has had an opportunity to witness far 
more of state-sanctioned organized religion’s negative aspects than has the United States.  
So while a British student faces Christian education with what she learns in British or 
European history classes, the average American student does not have to confront or 
come to terms with as many such connotations in American history.  The United States, 
for example, does have a legacy of anti-Semitism in many respects.  But the U.S. also 
served as a refuge for Eastern European Jews fleeing much bloodier pogroms in the 
nineteenth century.  With these examples and comparisons in mind, a secular initiative 
run by a religious organization that the American student appreciates, uninhibited by 
legacies of vehement religious prejudice on his country’s part, may well encourage his 
curiosity to explore the same organization’s ideas and objectives.  That same initiative, 
which would likely not “advance religion” in Great Britain, then, might conceivably 
“advance religion” in the United States!
146
 In practice, the effects of a state church remain minimal, but they certainly might offend someone who 
hold, or at least sympathizes with, the view that the state should treat all faiths as equal.  The monarch must 
be a member of the Church of England, 26 bishops of the Church of England sit in the House of Lords, 
which has the authority to approve or delay government policies, and state ceremonies follow Anglican 
rubrics.  The prime minister also advises the monarch on the appointment of senior church officials.  But 
unlike the situation in Lutheran Norway, for example, the Church of England receives no state funds.
147 ACT OF SETTLEMENT (U.K. 1701).
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This, of course, is a completely hypothetical scenario.  But it reflects the problems 
of referring to British culture and British history as a means of supporting the need for a 
particular law in the United States.  Great Britain may be a country that is outwardly 
similar to the U.S.  It is, however, different in enough respects that its laws stem from 
different factors and idiosyncrasies, which in turn preclude those same laws from being 
easily “transferred” to the United States, especially given the consequences of E.U. 
integration for British law.148  As a result, when considering whether to uphold or 
invalidate a particular law or practice, an American judge, whose expertise lies solely in 
the field of American law, should probably only refer to American legal authorities, 
which, in turn, result from applicable cultural factors.  
The Court’s reference to foreign legal sources in Lawrence and Roper and other 
such cases may not have been legally incorrect, then, because they did not bind American 
law in any way.  But they certainly were unwise in how they referred to perspectives 
stemming from different social and cultural aspects, however minor they may have been.
D) The Internationalist Approach Threatens Basic Constitutional Rights
The contention Roper implied by acknowledging the retired diplomats’ amicus
briefs – that American courts should pay attention to foreign opinion on purely domestic 
American legal issues for healthy foreign relations’ sake149 - creates a “slippery slope” 
for American jurisprudence.  If the United States is to worry about how other countries 
148 See Roper, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 2200 at *132 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(“It is beyond comprehension why we 
should look...to a country that has developed...with...the...recent submission to the jurisprudence of 
European courts dominated by continental jurists a legal, political, and social culture quite different from 
our own.”).
149
 Brief of Amici Curiae Former U.S. Diplomats, at 20, Roper (“By continuing to embrace the globally 
condemned practice of executing juvenile offenders, a few individual states [in the U.S.] risk undermining 
critical foreign policy interests…allowing Missouri to execute Christopher Simmons will diplomatically 
isolate the United States and hinder its foreign policy goals by alienating countries that have been 
American allies of long standing.”).
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would address its own constitutional issues, why not reevaluate other provisions of 
American law to see if other countries recognize them or not?  The likelihood that a 
future Supreme Court may take this kind of approach is likely quite slim, thereby making 
this question merit only minimal study.  But the question is a logical result of what 
occurred in Lawrence and Roper.
The fact that foreign opinion and laws stem from different cultural contexts, as 
previously discussed, would certainly make few Americans want the courts to embark 
upon such a trend.  Many foreign legal systems in other democracies, for example, do not 
recognize rights that Americans take for granted.  One could argue that the United States 
allows more freedom of speech than France or Germany given those two countries’ 
prohibitions on “hate” or racist speech or similar activities.150  While most Americans 
would probably (and hopefully) find the ideas underlying such speech or activities 
abhorrent, the right to say whatever one wants without bringing about physical harm to 
innocent parties and to believe in whatever ideology one wishes constitutes a central tenet 
of the American legal psyche.151
Speech regulations are not the only area where the U.S. differs from several 
foreign states.  The First Amendment prohibits the establishment of any religion.  But 
England has established the Anglican church as the official state church, which receives 
150
 The French National Assembly recently passed a law banning anyone from “provoking hatred” towards 
another person, through speech or other means, on the basis of gender or sexual orientation.  See
France:Sexist And Anti-Gay Hate Speech Banned, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2004, at 11.  In addition, a 
German court has sanctioned the confiscation of designer sweaters bearing S.S. –like logos.  Germany To 
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government preferences that other denominations cannot obtain.  The concept that one is 
innocent until proven guilty is a fundamental tenet of the American criminal justice 
system, leading to an elaborate array of protection for criminal suspects such as 
preclusions on unreasonable searches and seizures and the privilege against self-
incrimination.  Yet in most other countries, especially those adhering to a civil law 
system, a more inquisitorial philosophy pervades criminal justice systems.152  And in 
spite of the jury system’s “deep roots” in Great Britain, criminal trial by jury is nowhere 
near as common there as it is here.153  The right to criminal or civil trial by jury is 
nowhere near as common in the civil law states of the European Continent as it is in 
common law ones.  And again, these differences only involve nations that otherwise 
qualify as democracies that bear a degree of cultural similarity to the U.S.
If courts are to assume that U.S. law should have a certain approach to an issue 
because other states have the same approach, would the next step not consist of 
reevaluating some of the rights and guarantees of the U.S. Constitution to make them 
consistent with the laws of other nations?  Again, the chance that a future Supreme Court 
will undertake such an extensive review of American law is not great.  But claiming or 
implying that a foreign law should guide the American approach to a given constitutional 
issue to even a small extent, when American law is nonetheless available or when a case 
raises no non-U.S. law implications, certainly appears to pose this danger.
E) The Internationalist Approach Threatens the Judiciary’s Popular Legitimacy
Criticisms against the far-reaching decisions of unelected judges are nothing new 
to the American legal scene.  But it is, in a sense, fair to say that the American 
152 See Roper, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 2200 at *127-28 (identifying how the exclusionary rule has been 
“universally rejected” by other countries). 
153 Id. at  *133, citing CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, 91, 114-15 (C. Bradley ed. 1999).
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government’s elaborate system of checks and balances gives the people an indirect say 
over how judges interpret the law, albeit a very small one.
Consider the U.S. Supreme Court, for example.  The president of the United 
States, who the people elect through the popular vote and Electoral College, appoints the 
Court’s members.  The U.S. Senate, which is also popularly elected, confirms the 
president’s selections.  In theory, at least, who the president appoints and whether the 
Senate consents to the appointment will reflect the people’s preferences as to the sorts of 
judges they want on the Court and the legal philosophies to which they wish these jurists 
to adhere.
At the same time, it is important to remember that American voters only have a 
direct say in the actions of their own elected officials and not those of other countries.  
American voters, for example, have no say in electing the prime minister of Great 
Britain, who in turn recommends the appointment of individuals to the House of Lords, 
the highest avenue for appeals in England.  Supposedly, these individuals share the 
political and legal philosophies that the British people supported in voting his party’s 
candidates into a parliamentary majority.  So if the U.S. Supreme Court were to utilize 
British, or for that matter, any other country’s legislation or court decisions in making a 
constitutional interpretation, it would be referring to a source in whose development no 
American citizen had any kind of say at any time.
Proponents of the internationalist approach to constitutional interpretation that 
such cases as Lawrence and Roper illustrated would do well to consider whether this 
prospect is truly consistent with the concept of a sovereign nation.  Judges who choose to 
use their power to pick and choose foreign legal principles to impose on the American 
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people may face a well-deserved backlash from at least some segments of the general 
population.
These sorts of crises are not unprecedented.  One recent news article in a well-
known legal publication has commented on how many congressmen and senators feel 
that recent Supreme Court decisions have constituted unconstitutional and unwarranted 
usurpations of power that only legislators may rightfully exercise.154  And what members 
of a certain generation of attorneys can forget the popular movement, which some 
congressmen and senators supported, to impeach Earl Warren and William O. Douglas, 
who were supposedly guilty of the crime of excessive judicial activism?  Yet to ask 
Americans to put up with court decisions because foreigners happen to approve of them 
would risk a far greater backlash.  As Professor Jeremy Rabkin of Cornell University has 
stated, “we implicitly appeal to our citizens to put up with court rulings they find 
objectionable in the interest of maintaining a common constitutional framework.” 
Accordingly, “it is a big leap beyond this understanding to ask Americans to put up with 
a ruling because it is what foreigners happen to approve.”155
 It is easy to dismiss such concerns about this internationalist approach as bitter 
complaints regarding the results of decisions with which one does not agree.  But to refer 
to legal sources other than the Constitution in interpreting law simply threatens to make 
the judiciary into less of an institution of judges and more of a group of policymakers.  
The simple fact remains that effective research can probably find some foreign legal 
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source to support any possible conclusion, in the absence of any neutral, guiding 
principle.  Legislatures, then, remain the proper forum to examine whether the United 
States should emulate other countries’ practices concerning a specific issue.  The 
differences in the contexts in which laws are adopted are so important, and the 
comparative, overall level of expertise on foreign law in the United States so 
questionable, that considering the applicability of a foreign law merits the debate and 
openness inherent in legislative sessions, and not the confidentiality of judicial 
deliberations.
And there certainly may be practices of which Americans should feel ashamed 
given their uniqueness among western democracies and, in spite of the implications for 
the American system of government, whose abolition by the judiciary could conceivably 
be welcomed so far as results are concerned.  But, to paraphrase the well-known 
expression, the ends do not justify the means.  Perhaps the imposition of the death 
penalty on juveniles, then, can be likened to another country’s experience with a local 
practice that received similar condemnations worldwide.  
In the years following World War II, as its neighbors abolished the death penalty, 
France steadfastly retained capital punishment for murder and its infamous method of
execution – beheading by guillotine.  By the mid-1970’s, France was the last western 
European country to actively impose capital punishment, with its last execution taking 
place in 1977, in spite of widespread criticism by neighboring countries’ governments 
and human rights organizations.  One of the first acts of the Socialist government of 
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President Francois Mitterand was to enact a law, with the National Assembly’s approval, 
abolishing the death penalty for all crimes four years later.156
Why is this episode relevant?  The French experience with the death penalty quite 
frankly exemplifies the best model by which a country should decide as to whether to 
bow to international pressure or norms.  As if it were deciding to ratify a treaty, France 
abolished the death penalty at the conclusion of a democratic, legislative process.  It may 
be ironic, given this article’s arguments, that looking to a foreign country can 
demonstrate an optimal way to incorporate a foreign perspective into domestic law.  But 
the means by which France, and other countries such as Canada and Great Britain for that 
matter, abolished capital punishment is the sort of process that is consistent with the 
Framers’ intent underlying the laws of the United States – that legislatures, and not 
judges, should enact policy changes.  Just as treaties do not become law until Congress 
ratifies them, so too should international perspectives not be applied to purely domestic 
issues until the popular will on the subject has been fully heard.  In contrast, the 
imposition of such rules by unelected judges, who must constantly interpret laws in ways 
with which a majority of the population might disagree, surely would exacerbate the 
popular tensions this comparatively unaccountable branch of government faces and 
undermine the respect for its power upon which the rule of law’s stability depends.
CONCLUSION
To what extent, then, should American courts look to foreign sources of law and 
international conventions in determining the protections and guarantees of the United 
156 See Thomas Sancton, A Matter of Life or Death: The McVeigh Case Shows How Differently Europe and 
America View Capital Punishment, TIME, May 21, 2001, at 28; The Guillotine Falls, TIME, Sept. 28, 1981, 
at 43; Amnesty International, The Death Penalty: List of Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries (1 January 
2002), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGACT500022002.
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States Constitution?  With the exception of cases that raise questions of international law 
because they involve treaty obligations or facts that otherwise implicate international law 
issues or non-American interests in some form, the answer to that question should quite 
simply be that courts should make no such references. 
This article has sought to demonstrate why such an approach violates basic 
constitutional tenets and the consequences that might ensue if courts continue to follow 
this direction.  And while the greatest supporters on the Supreme Court of this trend 
primarily appear to be justices of a more “liberal” philosophical persuasion, those who 
adhere to that or any other such ideology should be equally concerned with the Court’s 
increasing internationalism.  
The increased reliance on non-U.S. legal sources, without any form of conceptual 
guidance or framework to which judges might refer, threatens to reduce the process of 
constitutional interpretation to a series of outcome-determinative tests.  There simply 
appears to have been no other guide to the Court’s use of foreign legal materials in the 
internationalist line of decisions than whether the given source consulted supported the 
specific result the Court wanted to reach.  Taken to an extreme, such a trend could result 
in judges facing a legal issue, considering the result they think is fair, and then finding a 
foreign legal source to support such a conclusion.  The casualty of any such approach 
would be the constitutionally oriented, even-handed, and dispassionate analyses that form 
the hallmarks of how judges are expected to evaluate any given dispute.
A judge’s unnecessary reliance on the law of any foreign country or inapplicable 
international convention to any degree in interpreting American law is quite simply a 
grave error that seriously endangers the concept of the United States as an independent 
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nation with the Constitution as its highest legal authority.  That Constitution begins: “We 
the People of the United States…establish the Constitution of the United States.”  It is our 
constitution and it is distinct from the bodies of law to which other nations adhere.  
Consequently, as Professor McGinnis stated in congressional testimony concerning this 
issue, referring to foreign law in determining what the Constitution means will only 
enable Americans to “lose identity with the document” whose “emphatically American 
nature…has been a source of affection and pride that have contributed to [America’s] 
social stability.”157  This article, therefore, respectfully suggests that the Supreme Court 
should immediately reconsider the use of non-U.S. legal materials as persuasive authority 
in cases with solely domestic implications.
157 Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On the Constitution of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 108th Congress 8 (2004)(statement 
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